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Security issues for software products 
Abstract 
Security seems to be an important concem for a growing number of applications. This 
document intends to clarify this idea by analysing the market situation regarding security. 
This analysis is done from the buyer's (and user's) point of view, but also from the seller's 
(and developer' s) point of view. Two aspects are analysed: the economical aspect and the 
technological aspect. 
The second part focus on the exploration of a development methodology for securing 
application (the ISO norm known as "Common Criteria") allowing developers to formalize 
the security needs and buyers (users) to get a better idea of how secure a product can be. 
The main purpose is to get more secure applications and more structured informations 
regarding an application security. An evaluation of this methodology is made to discover 
the advantages and potential drawbacks bound with its application. 
La sécurité semble poser un problème important pour de plus en plus d 'applications. 
Ce document tente de lever cette incertitude en analysant la situation du marché par 
rapport à la sécurité, aussi bien du point de vue de l 'acheteur (et des utilisateurs) que des 
vendeurs (des développeurs) et ce d'un point de vue économique et technologique. 
Puisque que la sécurité est nécessaire, la seconde partie se consacre à l 'analyse d 'une 
méthodologie de développement (La norme ISO connue sous le nom« Common Criteria ») 
permettant de formaliser les risques et les besoins en sécurité d 'une application. Ceci afin 
d 'obtenir des applications plus sûres et de permettre au client d 'obtenir plus 
d 'informations sur la sécurité de son application. Enfin une évaluation de cette 
méthodologie (sur base d 'un exemple) est faite afin de découvrir ces avantages ainsi que 
les problèmes potentiels liés à son application. 
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Glossary 
Assurance - Grounds for confidence that an entity meets its security objectives of one 
or more assurance component( s) from Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package. 
Class - A grouping of farnilies that share a common focus. In this document, it refers 
to functional requirement families. 
Component - The smallest selectable set of elements that may be included in a PP, an 
ST, or a package. It can be an objective, a threat, a policy, and assumption or a functional 
requirement. 
Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) - A package consisting of assurance 
components from Part 3 that represents a point on the CC predefined assurance scale. 
Family - A grouping of components that share security objectives but may differ in 
emphasis or rigor. 
Protection Profile (PP) - An implementation-independent set of security 
requirements for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs. 
Role - A predefined set of rules establishing the allowed interactions between a user 
and the application. 
Security attribute - Information associated with subjects, users and/or objects that is 
used for the enforcement of the application security rules. 
Security Fonction (SF) - A part of the application responsible for a specific security 
related functionality. 
Security objective - A statement of intent to counter identified threats and/or satisfy 
identified organization security policies and assumptions. 
Security Target (ST) - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used 
as the basis for evaluation of an identified target of evalution. 
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Target of Evaluation (TOE) - The application that is being taken in consideration. 
The most general definition include any kind of system, but this paper limit this definition 
to software application. 
TOE Security Fonctions (TSF) - The set of Security Function of a given TOE. 
TOE Security Policy (TSP) - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, 
protected and distributed within a TOE. 
TSF data - Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the 
TOE. 
XML - eXtensible Markup Language, a standardized open markup language designed 
to help in the exchange of information. 
XHTML - and "XMLized" version of HTML. lt looks like HTML but has a more 
strict syntax. The main interest of XHTML is that it is a specialization of XML therefore it 
can be processed by XSL T processor. 
XSL(T) - A programming language using the XML format designed to take an XML 
file as an input and produce some kind of output (an XHTML file most of the time). This 
language is widely used to separate the logic and visual part of an application. 
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IX 
1 Introduction 
Security is a very important problem in today's applications. Because the subject is 
rather large and cover lot of aspects (management, development, marketing, cryptography, 
etc.) this document will try to approach cover two aspects of security in software 
application from two points of view. 
The first question when approaching security is "Is security actually needed?" To 
answer this question we need to focus on the two sides of software life: the creator' s side 
and the user' s side. The creator of the software is responsible for mainly two things: 
developing the software (including the maintenance) and selling the software. The user has 
to buy the software first and use it. The first section will try to determine if security is 
needed for the two parts of each side: users, consumers, developer and software' s seller. 
The conclusion of this part is that security is relevant for every intervenient at a different 
level: security is an implicit feature for the users. The buyers want a good product so the 
need of the users must be fulfilled by the software company. At the end of this chain, 
developers need to implement software that is sellable. Apart from this economic point of 
view, this section also develops the fact that secure software is bound with the notion of 
"correct" software from a technical point of view. Because the answer to the question is a 
big "yes", we need to perform two more steps: explore the actual problem in order to be 
able to express it in a more formal way (see 2.3 Coverage) and formalize a way to make 
more secure software. This last step will be exposed in the second section. 
The second part of the document will try to formalize security m software 
development, starting from the threats partially exposed in the first part; we ' ll try to expose 
some way to respond to those threats. This section is based on the existing criteria on 
security: Common Criteria. Common Criteria defines two types of documents Protection 
Profile and Security Target. After a brief history of Common Criteria, we will develop the 
way to build those two documents. 
The third part is a presentation of a sample protection profile built for Océ market: 
"outputware". After a description of "outputware" a sample Protection Profile is exposed 
and some evaluation is done on the protection profile based on the sample PP writing 
expenences. 
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Because security is a very large domain, the conclusion will be in two parts: conclusion 
of this document and information about some possible future works on security to continue 
the ideas behind this text. 
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2 Context 
This section aims to limit the scope of this document. First of all , the document focuses 
on the definition of a "system", and tries to determine how this system is relevant for 
developers and consumers. Then we will point out the origin of security: threats. To end 
this section, we derive some objectives and security levels from the possible threat. 
2. 1 Overview 
Security does apply to a large domain, from the smallest embedded system to the 
biggest mainframe. In this point we are going to expose which kind of system we will 
focus . 
In some words: "system" in this document is related to "a desktop or server computer 
running software ' s and possibly exchanging information on a network". We don' t consider 
embedded system (some of them could be seen as a subset of the above definition) or 
system having direct mechanical interactions with their environment. This document is 
about software, not hardware or human related security issues. 
By limiting the scope of this document, we don' t mean human related security issues 
are not important. A common principle in computer science also applies for security: "the 
weakest link". Your system can be totally secure, the problem remains: you can ask 20 
passwords before reaching a document, once it' s printed, nothing but you can avoid it to 
fall in the wrong hands. And that's also why security is so hard to achieve, everything can 
be perfect except for one single line of code, and your system won' t be 100% secure. 
Moreover if this single line is abused, you may encounter the same loss of benefits as if the 
whole software was flawed. Therefore the objective is to achieve correct security, trying to 
reach perfection and knowing it' s impossible. 
2.2 Motivation 
Now that we know what kind of system we are talking about, we can begin with the 
unavoidable question: "why security?" First we try to see if security makes sense from a 
technical point of view then we focus on economic reality in order to get some realistic 
idea of the "interest" opportunities of being secure. 
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2.2.1 Technical 
From a technical point of view, security can be seen as "a way to make a system do 
what it' s intended to do ... and not more". Making system "do what it' s intended to do" is 
simply the respect of the various specifications, but it doesn't guarantee that we won't be 
able to do more. The point is that this "more" can be things like injecting and executing 
code into one application. This is of course pure theory, but the point is there: making 
secure software offers some guarantees that specification will be respected even when the 
system will be misused or stressed. 
In fact, making secure software is some kind of defensive programming: we don't 
count on things to work well; we just expect anything to happen. So we will design our 
software to handle any kind of situation in a correct way. It' s not a full pessimistic 
approach however. Due to reality constraints, software is not able to assume all the 
possible cases. However, they have to fallback correctly in case of a problem or misuse, 
and they have to do it without any corruption. For instance, the implementation of rollback 
procedures allows us to implement "correct" behaviour. If something goes wrong, 
returning to a "clean" state, we do not actually handle the specific error or attack. 
Nevertheless the result is that our software is still in accordance with an acceptable way of 
working. 
Another advantage of secure software is that it forces some restriction on development: 
any line of code might be a security hole, so developers are obligated to take care of what 
they do. It also constrains a developer to think about the impact of implementing this "new 
great killer feature", the impact on his code, on other people code, and finally on the whole 
system. This consideration can be extended to other aspects: if you care about memory 
management, you ' re forced to pay attention to memory allocation; if you care about speed, 
you' re forced to pay attention to anything that can be CPU bound. For security, you'll just 
need to pay attention to . . . almost anything. In fact, it even has an impact on memory 
management (buffer overrun/overflow) and speed optimization (removing test to gain 
some CPU cycles). 
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Of course, this is theory, no econornic reality in there. The truth is that security (like 
any other development activity) has a cost. As exposed in previous paragraph, perfect 
security isn't likely to be achieved, so it could become an endless financial hole for a 
company. The next paragraph will try to put some reality in there: from a technical point of 
view, security is "good" for your application, what's really good for your clients? 
2.2.2 Market 
This section will try to answer to the following question: "Is security relevant for 
consumers?". In other words, do software buyers want security, and most of ail: will they 
pay for it? 
Before investigating this question, another point may occur: "is security relevant for 
your company?" The fast, rough answer is no! Security has a cost, it takes time and it can 
even influence the project development's method (see 3.7.2 Evaluation Assurance Level 
(EAL) and other assurance related classes). But these facts can't be satisfying. First of all, 
the technical point of view gives us some idea that developing secured software can lead to 
better software (and possibly less support cost, integration cost ... ) and the second point is 
obvious: if security is a feature required by your client, then security is relevant for your 
company. That's why it's fair to take the client as the basis of our investigation: the needs 
of the client are ( or should be at least) the needs of an enterprise, as long as this enterprise 
needs to survive and make profits. 
a. First sight 
To determine how security is important to clients we can watch some advertising, press 
articles, news, etc. After a first sight, one thing is sure: people talk about security, but the 
meanings of information they get/publish depend of the kind of users, we can separate 
them in 3 classes described in the following table. 
Home end-users This category represents anyone usmg computer outside his 
company. 
You get information about security everyday: 
"Jt 's 11:54am and l've about 10 Spams about security related 
issue in my mai/box everyday. Today, the Microsoft website 
headlines 3 step to protect your computer. As everyday, 
5 
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securityfocus.com is active (7 vulnerabilities in various softwares 
today). Last week, 3 security related patches were published by 
Microsoft, and at least one critical for Linux/Unix software. " 
Therefore, you can corne and get information, or the information 
cornes to you in form of Spam or automatic update. 
Selling security is easy for at least one reason: people 's fear! It is 
easier to sell something when you can make people believe that 
their computer will stop working or that other people can steal 
them. It does not mean that security is not useful, but it means that 
you do not need to run and pay for everything to be correctly safe. 
The same kind of things happens with many situations of the 
everyday life: a good Iock is great for your main door, but you 
won' t always buy the most expensive one, and adding two other 
locks won't be useful if the first is efficient, it will just be a bit 
more boring to close/open your door. 
Those users are interesting, and represent an important part of the 
PC users, but we will not focus on them. It could be the topic of 
other documents like "how to make family pc more secure?" and 
seems to be at the core of some marketing operation from major 
software vendors. 
They can be seen as a subclass of end-users. They are most 
experimented and interest in computer. (They are talking about 
how "xyz" 1.02 is worst than 1.03.) They are often able to 
accurately identify differences between two releases of software. 
Tracking the last security flaw of products, some ofthem are even 
the pirates. 
This category includes the most stupid "script kiddies" up to the 
best hackers. The main point is that they have some knowledge of 
1 You can find many definitions of « geeks », basically it's someone who spend time on his computer for 
« fun », you can get a more complete definition on http://www.circus.com/-omni/geek.html for instance. 
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Company/ corporate 
users. 
their system, and have some possibilities to abuse other' s 
systems. 
That's the most interesting one for us. First of all, company 
employees and end-users use the same kind of hardware/software; 
.Subsequently they are concerned by identical kind of threats .. 
However, it must be thought differently: an antivirus software for 
the whole company and your personal home computer one' are 
rather different even if they use the same technologies. Loosing a 
personal document with your pet's name or losing a document 
targeted as internai use in your company isn't really the same, the 
effects are rather different (well, except if your company sells 
pets ... ). 
For those reasons, one can understand that advertisement for 
security targeted to company is distinctive. Y ou can find some on 
the web, m dedicated newspapers. For now most of the 
advertising is third party product that try to add more security to a 
current product (adding firewall to your OS, antivirus, safe 
backup, etc ... ). As a side note: One of the most widespread 
security related software seems to be secure payment framework. 
That sounds logic, money 1s money ! People realize that 
something is critical if money is involved, payment has always 
been a problem during transaction, even before computer and the 
internet. 
From those 3 categories, we will only consider one: corporate users. 
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b. "Outputware" 
As we will focus some part on this document on "document management" software2, 
we will have a look at security' s advertisements in output management products. Many 
companies are working in this domain of application; the following will be based on seven 
ofthem. 
The first step of the analysis was to search the product's information, to discover how 
they advertise "at first sight" the security of their products. The next step was a browse 
among(Google search on) their websites to get how many pages contain the word 
"security" This count down aims to give an idea of the amount of information about 
security that you can find. The last step was a global Google search with their product 
names and the word "security", in order to get external information. The results were rather 
poor so additional searches have been made using "common" security related words, in 
order to find more information. It wasn't really a success neither, and didn' t provide more 
information. Remember that the purpose was to see how the security is advertised, and was 
not about finding information on security on the whole Internet. 
Sorne researches have also been done from the developer point of view by reading 
some schedules. Nothing relevant has been found, unless the product was dedicated to 
security none of those document focused on security. It was just implicitly secure. 
Name Website #result' More information 
SEAL http://www.sealsyst 13/7 No real security concems, their products are just 
systems ems.de "reliable" and Google gives 13 results with 
security on the main website. (with lot of off-
topic entries). 
2 Basically, document management software are software that take many kind of input and route them to 
many kind of output. Generally, document are the input (windows printing services, SAP, .. . ) and printers 
are the output. The role of this software's is to add transformation between and interpretation (accounting, 
reformatting, enhancement) in an efficient way (using Joad balancing, advanced queuing, etc . .. ). See 4.1 
Usage mode] for a detailed explaination. 
3 Results are the number of result found by the Google search engine. The first number is the number of 
result exposed by Google, the second is the number of relevant result (sometimes the word security appears 
in a webpage for a different reason than product security, for instance web browser security settings needed 
to view the website). 
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Dazel http://www.dazel.co 3/0 No real security concems, it just "ensures 
(HP) ml security". No off-topic documents, but no page 
are about security, it's always in context of kind 
"necessary security", "ensure security". 
Agfa http:/ / graphics.agfa. 1/1 No security concem, their software is just 
delano com/product/CatPro reliable. Google gives one off-topic result. 
d _ DisplayPublic.ht Extemal search gives 2 off-topic results. Security 
ml?id=7539 really doesn't seem to be an issue for this 
solution. 
IBM http://www.printers. 32/2 No real security concems, again, their products 




Kofax http://www.kofax.co - 89 They have something about security, 89 results in 
m Google, a question in the FAQ. But they rely on 
third party for most of their security. "The 
software is secure because the environment is 
secure" 
Océ http: //www.oce.com 95 More information about security (security mixed 
with confidentiality becomes a feature ), some 
misleading between "authentification", "right 
management" and "security" . 
Sharp ... 148 The website seems to concem only software 
related to hardware product ( drivers, bios, . .. ) 
The results are for ail the Sharp products. 
In order to make some comparison, here are some other results: 
Microso www .microsoft.com - 139.000 
ft 
Microso http://office.microso - 609 This result is higher than what we've got for 
ft Office fi.corn "outputware", and it doesn't include developer 
related information (http://msdn.microsoft.com). 
supports (http://sui:mort.microsoft.com) or beta 
products (htto://beta.microsoft.com). 
From this investigation, we can extract the following information: 
• Security doesn't seem to be one of the primary objectives, like if it was "secure by 
default", or "implicitly secure". Why that? If security doesn't seem to be advertised 
as an important feature, does it mean that it's nota decisive feature for the client? 
• When the company advertises security they often rely on the third party software 
they're using for security concern ("use internai 11S security", "rely on Windows 
2000 user management", "based on the proven Unix technology"). lt can be 
compared to table in Annex A. showing that no system (OS) is completely safe. A 
basic rely on third party application for security doesn't guarantee anything. 
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• That seems logic that Microsoft does advertise more about security in his product: 
it's a bigger company, much more of software's (but when we consider only 
Microsoft Office it still gives more results that all the "outputwares" combined), 
and other company relies on Microsoft for security. Another fact is that Microsoft 
isn' t very famous for his security, that shows us that advertising security and being 
secure isn' t the same. 
c. Sorne tacts 
To think about this problem, we have to take the specific aspects of security in account: 
security isn' t really a feature, it doesn't add anything to the application (it can impact some 
of the feature, like the need to enter user and password to use the software, but by itself, 
it' s not a new functionality), it just ensures that the application runs as expected, even 
when someone try to abuse the system. It could be seen as "implicit": when you buy a car, 
you' re not looking at the feature list to check if it's able to run; it' s a car, without that it 
can' t be called a car. It seems that it's the same for software: when you buy software, it 
should work, if not, it can't be called software. Claiming that users want their application 
to work seems obvious, and it is! From this point we can try to determine if security is 
really an issue in our current world: how fast will an application be broken, if it' s not 
secure? There is no answer to this question, it depends of lot of factors, but it can be 
interesting to look at some facts4. 
From ZDNet, 29 January 2003, bttp://zdnet.com.com/2100-1105-982554.html 
PSINet Europe purposely built an unprotected server and connected it to the Internet to 
determine how quickly it would be compromised. Their findings were astonishing: 
• The server was maliciously attacked 467 times in the first 24 hours 
4 We must take those statistics with care: most company doesn ' t want people to know they were 
successfully attacked. lt's not really a problem here; we can take that information as a minimum. Because of 
the large number ofresult of some query, off-topic search wasn ' t done for every search. 
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• Most of the attacks originated in the US or Western Europe 
• After 3 weeks, a total of 626 attacks were detected against the server 
This experirnentation gives us important information: the threat exists, your system can 
be the target of pirates, they exist, they 're there, and they may try to abuse your system. It 
doesn 't rnean that your system will suffer 626 attacks in 3 weeks, but the weakest link is 
still true here: one successful attack can do the same damage as 626 attacks. It's not 
something that happens only in movies. (In September 2003 the source code of a future 
game from Valve software was stolen and made available on various IRC and P2P 
network.) 
From CERT/CC, 17 August 2000, http://www.cert.org/present/cert-overview-
trends/index.htm 
Carnegie Mellon University estimates that 99% of all reported intrusions "result 
through exploitation of known vulnerabilities or configuration errors, [for which] 
countermeasures were available." This directly shows how truly important it is to 
regularly patch systems, as well as keep current with network and system countermeasures. 
In a test to see how fast a non-published, unpatched, system would be discovered, the 
San Diego Supercomputer Center placed a default installation, Red Hat Linux 5.2 machine 
on the Internet. 
• 8 hours after installation, the system was probed for RPC vulnerabilities. 
• 21 days after installation, there had been 20 targeted, unsuccessful, exploits 
attempted. 
Approximately 40 days after installation, a vulnerable POP service was comprornised, 
and the intruder installed a Sniffer, several backdoors, and wiped out the system logs. 
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This one add one important information: 99% percent of the attacks were "avoidable 
attacks", and that' s a very important point, still the weakest link: the latest version of your 
software can be free of (known) security hole, if your users are still using an old version, 
their systems aren' t secure, if they misuses your software, misconfigure something, doesn' t 
protect access to critical data, their systems won't be secure. It can lead to two partial 
conclusions: 
• Software update is important, if developers could make update easier, they would 
make their software more secure in the real world, so software update is a way to 
get more security, making your software easily updateable is important for your 
users. Another important aspect is ease of configuration of security related features. 
This aspect seems to be the target of some software company; it's a big 
improvement for security. 
• Users and administrators need to be trained! Software applications are like lot of 
other goods: they won't run for year without update. It seems obvious ... but it 
looks like it' s not really applied. Lot of users intentionally tum off all the 
"automatic update", "virus protection", etc .. . 
From Computer Economies, 2 January 2002, 
http://www.computereconomics.com/cei/press/pr9210l.htm 
It is estimated that the worldwide impact of malicious code was 13 .2 Billion Dollars in 
the year 2001 al one, with the largest contributors being SirCam at $1 .15 Billion, Code Red 
(all variants) at $2.62 Billion, and NIMDA at $635 Million. 
This one gives us an estimation of the cost impact of malicious code (virus), of course 
it' s "estimated" and this kind of information is often to take with care. But even if the 
result is biased, it' s about billion dollars, not some thousand dollars; it can give an idea of 
how far an insecure system can generate costs. 
From Joint CAIDA, ICSI, Silicon Defense, UC Berkeley, and UC San Diego, 01 February 
2003, http://www.caida.org/analysis/security/sapphire/ 
An analysis of the Sapphire/Slammer SQL worm shows: 
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• "This worm required roughly 10 minutes to spread worldwide making it by far the 
fastest worm to date." 
• "In the early stages [the number of compromised hosts] was doubling in size every 
8.5 seconds." 
• "At its peak, achieved approximately 3 minutes after it was released, Sapphire 
scanned the net at over 55 million IP addresses per second." 
• "It infected at least 75,000 victims and probably considerably more." 
From 
http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/Global%20Security%20Survey%202003.pdf 
From this study, we can get some pieces of information: 
• 63% of the enterprises see security spending as a "necessary cost of doing 
business" . 
• About 39% of the respondents acknowledged that their systems had been 
compromised in some ways during the last year. 
This study can help us understand how companies see security, for most of them it's 
"necessary cost of doing business" . It enforces our idea of security as being implicitly 
needed: it's something needed to run, nota feature that you'll prefer over one other when 
you' re looking for a solution. 
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We could also wonder if those kinds of attacks are new, if security problem are new, 
media often present security threats as "new", "caused by the internet". lt seems logic to 
think that more and more connected architecture can lead to more attack, and it must be 
partially true. On the other side, we can find information about nurnber of "computer 
related crime", for instance in 1976; one source identified 339 cases with an average lost of 
$544.0005. Most ofthem were simply employees modifying their financial records. 
2.2.3 Conclusion 
From all those information, we can extract one fact: security is a concem for the client, 
not a direct feature request, but something implicitly bound with their idea of software. 
They want software that runs, and if the software contains ho les, there is a potential risk of 
failure. It's not new and probably won' t stop during the next years. 
2.3 Coverage 
What does security implies? What kinds of things are important for a secure system? 
We can extract some relevant point from the above information: 
• A large part of "attack" cornes from the inside. 
• 99% of the attacks are "known vulnerabilities". 
• lt can go very fast and be very expensive. 
5 It's also important to note that the median loss is very close to this, it' s not biased by one or two 
important case around hundreds of small one. 
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The fact that "attacks corne from the inside" lead us to think that people play a very 
important role in security: always the weakest link, your printer can be as secure as 
possible, if someone steal the printed document, security isn't achieved. The same kind of 
things applies for all security related domain (your password can be as complex as needed, 
if there's a post-it at the top of the screen, well it's "just" a reminder. .. ). Peoples also play 
an important role in maintaining their software: if they don't apply patch from software 
vendor, their systems can' t be secure, even worst: known security issue are easy to find on 
the internet, hacking a system becomes as easy as "googling" for the last news about your 
favourite artist6. 
Covering those kind of domains can be very interesting, but is more related to intemal 
organization, ease of use and isn' t directly related to computer science (some of the rules 
that can be applied could also apply in an environment without computer, things like 
maintaining a list of people allowed to enter a building, to access a resource, etc ... ). 
There's also lot of other aspects that could be interesting to cover, like legal issues: 
how far is it allowed protecting their data, can we make them unreadable by legal 
authority? Can our boss read our e-mail? Oris it legitimate to protect them? What kind of 
cryptography system could be used? Can audit trace be used as evidence in a court? . .. 
Again all those question can be very interesting, but it' s more law than computer sciences. 
We need to focus on computer sciences, and even more than that on software. When 
talking about security, most sources isolate 5 main security features ( developed in the next 
sections); that doesn't mean that the other doesn't have anything to do with security, but 
it' s a good start. 
6 A big distinction must be made between cracking the system (for instance: get more right, read a 
confidential document.. .) and no being identified. The first partis easy, the second part becomes more and 
more difficult. Being anonymous on internet is one of the real issue about cracking a system. 
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2.3.1 User authentication and authorization 
User identification is the basis of security, to protect something against someone; we 
need to know this someone (authentication). Applying a "no access at all to anybody" isn' t 
acceptable, it's rather obvious: if we need to protect something, it's because it has some 
value to someone, and this someone will of course need to get this information in an 
understandable way. Even with simple systems with only one possible user, this user, even 
if unique, is someone, can and can't do specific actions on the system (authorization). 
2.3.2 Data protection 
Data protection covers all the way software can use protect their data' s, this include of 
course data encryption. It' s heavily related with user identification and encryption key 
management. The purpose is of course to disallow unauthorized people to retrieve 
information from the protected data. 
2.3.3 Communication 
Communication covers the exchange of information between only subsystems of our 
system. Secure communication is of course need for data protection, and proper user 
authentication. This topic will focus on how to ensure "safe communication". This rather 
wide topic is covered by some "common principles", like the ACID7 nature of transaction. 
Communication is separated from the rest because it has some specific issue, for 
instance a secure, encrypted system with safe user identification could be abused with 
things like replays8, repudiation, etc. 
7 ACJD: Atomicity, Consistency, Isolation and Durability. Four characteristics needed to provide reliable 
transaction in a distributed environment. 
8 Replays basically consist of repeating the same date twice on a connection, with or without small 
modification to get the expected result. For instance repeating two times the same bank transaction can make 
the pirate twice as rich as expected. 
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2.3.4 Audit 
Auditing is important and very important when security isn't efficient! That may look a 
bit strange, but starting with the fact that no system can be 100% secure, having good 
logging of what happens to the system can provide two things: 
• Being able to recover faster from an attack (the pirates touched this document and 
this one only, this kind of things ). 
• Being able to get more information about the attacked system (which IP, when, 
how many times, ... ). Most of the times, this kind of information that makes 
authority catch the cracker. 
That's again one of the important facts of security: nothing is 100% secure, everything 
can be abused, making software secure sometimes implies taking care of abusing, making 
things perform better if it goes bad. A correct auditing of a system could of course help 
prevent attack ("someone is trying to brute force my password, l'll stop him") but also help 
after the attack! 
This domain also has some legal issues, for instance what' s the value of this kind of 
information in a tribunal, and cana trace be used to make someone guilty or innocent? 
2.3.5 Key management (cryptography) 
Cryptography is the key to protect data; if existed before computer existed9. It's a huge 
domain covered by thousand of books, articles and it could lead to thousand works like this 
one. That' s why we will focus on a very small subset of cryptography: key management, 
and even smaller: not how to store the key safely, but only the management of the key as 
critical resources. That can be seen as data protection but not related to the application 
"useful" data, but to the "security related" data. 
9 One of the first known fonns of cryptography is the Caesar Cypher which is said to have been used by 
Julius Caesar to cornrnunicate with his anny. lt 's a simple substitution cipher consisting of shifting letter in a 
message. 
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It can be useful to note that one of the domains that have the most legal issue is 
cryptography: most of the algorithm used cornes from military sources; some country 
doesn't allow the use of cryptography (or the use of cryptography stronger than a given 
level). 
2.4 Threats 
A system is not secure by default, specific action need to be taken in order to improve 
the security of a system. Even worst: perfect security can't be reached. We will try to 
determine the kind of threats that may affect a system. 
Focusing on threats can be very long and difficult, that's why we will only focus on 
threats related to software, not their meanings. For instance data destruction can threaten 
lot of part of a company, it can lead to loss in various domain for the company itself and 
for their clients, but no matter the real threat it represent, for the software part of the 
system, it' s still data loss. 
2.4.1 Data related threats 
Data related threat are too wide, because computer science is often described as 
"information management", and because information is represented in some kind of binary 
format often called data, anything that can affect a system is "data related". This section 
won't focus on that, but only when pirates directly affect the data: destroy data, modify 
data or steal data. 
a. Data loss 
Data loss is our first threat, the most well known kind of data loss is web defacing, 
every day, some website are defaced by hackers for various reasons, the basic idea is to 
destroy the current website content and sometimes to replace it with another. Of course, 
it' s not limited to this kind of loss, it can go a lot farther and sensitive (non public) 
information can be destroyed too. The idea beyond is always to destroy something, not to 
use them or take any profit of the information (but one can get profit from the loss of 
another . . . ). 
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b. Data corruption 
The second threat is data corruption, pirate modifying sensitive data to make them have 
another meaning. This can be achieved directly (by editing files for instance) or indirectly 
(by modifying the way the system works, for instance redirecting any mail to a given 
mailbox ... ). It's important to make the distinction between data loss and data corruption 
for the following reason: 
• Data loss is visible: the data isn' t there anymore. Data corruption can take long 
time to be discovered. For instance an attempt was made to corrupt the Linux 
kemel source tree. Fortunately the error was discovered by watching CVS 10 logs. 
• Data loss is "easy", hackers doesn't need to understand what the data are. 
c. Data stealing 
The third data related threat is steal of information, hacker doesn't modify or delete 
anything, they just the information they need, and it can be any kind of information, from 
the source code of the next FPS 11 of Valve studio 12 to a series of credit card nurnber stol en 
from an e-commerce website 13 or other things like a intemal Microsoft memo about future 
marketing policy against Linux 14 • It can of course also be any kind of industrial or 
intellectual property. 
1° CYS: Concurrent Yersionning System: Software that help teams of developer manage a single source 
repository. A CYS server audit ail the operation made on the repository . This example is also a good 
illustration ofwhy auditing is an important security feature. 
11 FPS : First person shooter, videogame where the view of the game try to look like what a human see, 
the player is « inside » the body of the people he is controlling. The first FPS was wolfenstein in 1990. This 
kind of game is also called « Doom like ». 
12 See http://www.gamespot.com/pc/action/haltlife2/news 6076314.html for more information. 
13 See http://money.cnn.com/2003/02/ 18/technology/creditcards/ for more information. 
14 See http://www.opensource.org/halloween/ for more information. 
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It's important to note that, if the first threat can be easily detected (after the attack), the 
two last can only be efficiently detected if a good logging is performed on the system. 
2.4.2 Availability 
The idea behind this is to make a service unavailable in one way or another, it can be 
seen as a kind of data destruction, but generally data are just made "unavailable", and not 
erased. 
There are two widespread way to make a service unavailable: 
1. "Crashing" the system. 
2. "Flooding" the system. 
The first one generally implies to use the system in a way it was not designed to. For 
instance sending him email addresses of 500 characters where the system only indented to 
get a maximum of 256 characters. If the system isn' t build against this kind of attack, it 
may crash, and thus it won't be able to provide his services anymore. 
The second one is more complex to put in place and more complex to prevent (almost 
impossible). The concept is very simple: send million request for a service until the system 
doesn' t have the time to answer. The big problem with this kind of attack is that it' s simply 
using the system in a "normal" way and during this kind of attack it' s very difficult to 
make the distinction between "good" connection (from a real users that really need to 
service) and "bad corrections" (intended to flood the system). The distributed nature of 
those attacks makes them hard to detect: lot of computers are attacking a single target, 
blocking a single IP can' t do the job. Lot of recent virus are doing this kind of DDOS 
(Distributed Deny Of Services) attack, the most known was blaster, a virus designed to 
flood one of the Microsoft Windows Update website (http://www.windowsupdate.com). 
More recently (may 2004) a new virus was created from a flow in another part of the 
Windows operating system, the virus is called "Sasser" . 
2.5 Objectives and security leve/ 
From the threat of the section D, we can extract the basic objective of a secure system: 
• Enforce reliability and system availability. 
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• Ensure data protection 
• Enforce confidentiality. 
To reach those objectives there is a set of tools and concepts ( encryption, transaction, 
role based user management, journalized file system ... ) and that need to be put in place by 
developers to be efficient. Next section will try to dig a big deeper in this topic, mostly 
how they can be expressed in a clean normalized way. 
On the other side and because a 100% secure system can't be reached, there is some 
way to make claims about a system. "Security levels" are important in order to get more 
information about the security that is really implemented. Security level goes from the 
lowest to the most proven. There are different scale that exist (EAL used in this document 
but also respective scale for each country-specific criteria, see 3.7.2 Evaluation Assurance 
Level (EAL) and other assurance related classes) but they can be surnrnarized as: At the 
bottom, the less secure, kind of "our product is secure because we 've tested it' ' 
(functionally tested), and the top, a system that is "proven to be secure, tested by a third 
party with a given method" (formally verified design and tested). 
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3 Model 
Security is a never reached objective: achieving security has an impact on all the 
development of an application. For all the task related to development, some model, some 
methodology exist to help us, that's the same for security: there are some step that can be 
achieved to give some structure to our security needs, to be able to present an application 
as secure (or not) more easily. We will focus on that for the next part of the document, we 
will present a model that try to help us in our task. 
We will use a model called "Common Criteria", to be more precise the "Evaluation 
Criteria for Information Technology Security" . We will try to explain why this model was 
chosen. After, we will try to discover for whom this model can be useful. From there we 
will be able to dig into the model. 
But first of all, because common criteria, like lot of model, imply the use of dedicated 
vocabulary and concept, we will expose a fast presentation of common criteria, in orders to 
"get into the concept behind" common criteria. 
3. 1 Fast presentation 
We know, we need to formalize security requirements, to achieve this objective, 
Common Criteria use a threat/objective approach: attack against a product represent a 
threat (see 3.5.2c. ) for a company, therefore for the software they use. Companies also 
often have some "rules" to follow, extemal to the application, for instance, if a company 
want ISO certification, some rules apply ( called policies see 3 .5 .2b. ). Also, we live in the 
real world, so we can't expect too much from security: it must be realistic, realizable; 
therefore we also need some assumption (see 3.5.2a. ) about our environment, to filter 
what' s realizable in our context and what' s not (for instance, any password can be abused, 
it may takes time but it' s still possible, so a "unbreakable password" isn' t realizable) . 
Our security needs corne from these 3 things: threats, "company rules" called policies 
and real world constraint called assumptions. Those 3 things allow us to derive some 
objective to fulfil threat, policies and assumptions. 
And finally from those objectives we will be able to create the requirement list (see 
3.5.4 Functional requirement), which will be the basis of our system' s specifications. 
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Those simple concepts allow us to understand the interest of cornrnon criteria: 
structured information. With such a structure, we are able to define some rules to apply in 
order to test if our criteria are coherent, correct and in some way complete. That' s the 
second part of cornrnon criteria, assurance evaluation (see 3.7 Assurance approach). For 
instance because threats, policies, assumptions and objectives are rather formal, we can 
ensure that all objectives are there to cover existing threats or policies, that our 
assumptions doesn't prevent the implementation of our security feature (see 3.7.1 PP and 
ST evaluation and to see an example of coverage test, see 3.5.2c. Threats). 
In short cornrnon criteria bring some structure to security related document 
(Assessment review, specification, testing, audit document,) and some guideline in the 
process of getting some assurance about our product. 
The rest of this section will give detailed information about every part of a Cornrnon 
Criteria based document and some information about the process involved. 
3.2 History 
In the first part of this document, we get to the conclusion that security has some 
importance in the development of a product (from the developer's and from the 
consumer's point of view). Of course this obvious conclusion is shared by lot of people. 
Since the early 70s, security become a concem, therefore lot of countries were trying to 
create some "criteria" regarding security, and that' s why we are focusing on cornrnon 
criteria, in short: The Cornrnon Criteria speficifications are is the result of many criteria 
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In the early 1980's the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) was 
developed in the United States, in Europe (mostly France, Germany, the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom), the Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC) 
version 1.2 was published in 1991. In Canada, it was the Canadian Trusted Computer 
Product Evaluation Criteria (CTCEC) (version 3.0 was published in 1993) and it was 
already an attempt to unify criteria from Europe and United States (ITSEC and TCSEC). In 
the meantime, the Federal Criteria for Information Technology Security (FC) version 1.0 
was published as a second approach to combine North American and European concepts 
for evaluation criteria. 
As already said before, lots of people were trying to get some "criteria" in order to 
evaluate the security of their product (or the security of products they intended to buy). 
That's why in 1990, the ISO organization begin his work to develop a standard evaluation 
criteria for general use. 
In June 1993, the sponsoring organizations of the CTCPEC, FC, TCSEC and ITSEC 
began a joint activity to align their separate criteria into a single set of IT security criteria 
that could be widely used. 
In January 1996, the common criteria editorial board published version 1.0 of the 
common criteria. This document was approved by ISO in April 1996 for distribution as a 
draft. 
After more than a year of review, feedback, revision and some reorganization in the 
common criteria organization, the 2.0 "beta" was published. Now we use Common Criteria 
version 2.0. 
For historical and consistency reason, we still use the term "common criteria" to refer 
to what's officially called "Evaluation Criteria for Information Technology Security". 
3.3 Scope 
The common criteria weren't developed to fit the specific needs of one intervenient of a 
software development, it tries to cover in an independent way, all the aspect from the 
consumers to the evaluators, we will describe here what users could expect to get from 
common criteria. 
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3.3.1 Users 
Common Criteria defines a way to present security related information in a methodical, 
formai and clean way. That's the main interest for users; they get something they canuse 
to compare a product with another. 
The different level of abstraction provided by common criteria also allows some clients 
to inform a software vendor about their security needs. For instance one could want the 
product to fit a given protection profile, to enforce a given level of security (EAL ), etc. 
(see later section to get a description of those concepts). 
Note: please note that Common Criteria identifies users as consumers. 
3.3.2 Developers 
Developers (and software vendor) can get many things from common criteria: 
1. A CC construct that will allow them to make claims about their product. 
2. A list of threats that can affect the system, objectives to counter those threats and a 
list of functional requirement to achieve those objectives. Basically they get some 
pieces of information to specify their system as a secure system. 
3. Sorne references and sample documents for other products in order to help them 
address security issues for their own products. 
3.3.3 Evaluators 
One of the main objectives of the common criteria is to allow the evaluation of a 
product; security criteria are expressed in a standard way. This allows comparison between 
various products, and to test the conformance of a product with extemal security 
requirements. 
Common criteria also provide a set of general actions that an evaluator could follow to 
get an idea of the product from a security point of view. 
CC also provide a "measure" of security, in the form of an assurance level (see 3.7.2 
Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) and other assurance related classes), this measure 
relevant information for fast evaluation of a product. 
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3.3.4 Others 
Other people can find some interests in common criteria. For instance: 
• Auditors, both intemal and extemal, common criteria will help them to make 
assessment about the adequacy of the security of a system. 
• Security architects and designers responsible for the specification of the security 
content of IT systems and product. 
• Accreditors, they will follow the same path as evaluators in order to accept the use 
of a system in a particular environment. 
• 
In short: all the people interested in some way by the security of a product can get some 
useful information from a document based on the common criteria. A strange effect of that 
is that system cracker may also find useful information. That could lead us to another: Is it 
always worth to reveal information about the security of a product? This is another large 
topic related to security; it depends of lot of criteria's (who use the system? who may want 
to affect it? what's the real threats related to this system? etc .. . ). It's also the ground for 
some debates about open source versus closed source projects. It's a huge discussion that 
involve development methodology, user consideration, philosophy, therefore it' s out of the 
scope of this document. We will start from the point of view that it' s up to each company 
to decide if they publish or not document about security, but no matter if the make it 
widely available or not, it' s still important to get those information in a structured form. 
That's what of the objective of the common criteria. 
3.4 Overview 
We know that common criteria are like "the union of all the other" criteria. We've also 
seen that it' s not "just a developer stuff' and that it can be useful for lot of people. Now, 
it' s time to exp Iain what exactly common criteria are and how they try to achieve their 
goals. 
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Corn.mon criteria define multiple level requirements, from the most generic up to the 
application. The construction is made from an abstract list of requirement, called 
"Protection profile". From this list, author will derive a list of requirements suitable for 
their application; this list is called Security Target (ST). This is a refined requirement list 
that begins to look like "requirements". The final step will be to compare those 

























The next paragraph will focus on better definition of the PP, ST and TOE. 
3.5 Protection Profile (PP) 
It' s hard to define protection profile more than "a list of threats, objectives and 
functional requirements covering the security of a specific domain". Because it's often 
easier to get into a concept with some examples, we will use a sample during our 
explanation. As an example we will use information extracted from the protection profile 
that exists for operating systems 15 . At the end of this section, there will also be an example 
PP related to outputware. 
15 See "Windows 2000 Security Target ST Version 2.0 18 October 2002". 
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The main interest of protection profile is that they're rather structured. Therefore they 
offer a common and clean representation of security threats, objectives and functional 
requirements. The formalism used allows performing some "integrity test" on the 
protection profile to ensure that it is coherent and complete. 
The next figure shows the content of protection, and next sections will provide more 
information about each of those section. 
PROTECTION PROFILE 
PP Introduction PP Identification 
PP Overview 






PP Application Notes 
Rationale 
General Threats Table 
General Policy Statements 
Genèral Assumptions Table 
Security Objectives for the TOE } 
Objectives 
Security Objectives for the Environment 
Security Requ!rements for _ 





Detailed Attacks Table 
Security Objectives Rationale Detailed Policy Stmts Table 
Mapping Tables 
Security Requirements Rationale Mapping Tables 
3.5.1 Introduction and system overview 
The first part describes the TOE, in other word, the kind of product for which the PP is 
suitable. It contains a description of the system. It' s the first necessary step to limit the 
scope of the protection profile. 
A:fter reading the introduction, anyone should be able to determine: 
• If the protection profile applies to the product he is concerning about. 
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• If the protection profile applies to his company (some protection profile are 
targeted to specific environment). 
3.5.2 Description of the security environ ment and TOE description 
An environment can be described in many ways, CC chooses the "threats approach", 
and secure environment is described by "what can impact the system?". Of course, a 
system isn't standalone stuff. It's always part of something. So extemal rules need to be 
applied to discover the system and analyze existing threats. Therefore the description will 
contain 3 things: assumptions, polices and threats. We will detail each of those parts in the 
next sections. 
a. Assumptions 
Assumptions are simple assertions regarding the system. This first step is helpful to 
reduce the scope of the PP. Because 100% secure software can't be reached, it' s good to 
specify what part ofthose percent won't be reached anyway. 





The TOE 1s constructed 
from near-tenn 
achievable, commercial 
off the shelf (COTS) 
information technology. 
The TOE is not expected 
to be able to sufficiently 
mitigate the risks resulting 




This assumption is a key 
driver in determining the 
nature of the expectations 
toward, and hence the 
requirements to placed 
upon, the TOE. 
I t 1s not reasonable to 
expect near term COTS 
products to provide 
sufficient protection 
against the malicious 
actions of authorized 
individuals. 
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As you can see, assumptions really limit the scope of the security achieved by the TOE. 
lt's important to achieve the idea of completeness of a PP. A PP is complete ... if it 
describes correctly what it can't achieve. lt also "put some reality" in the concept: PP 
aren't magical solution to get a system secure, it' s a real solution to get the most secure 
system actually realizable with current technologies. 
b. Policies 
Policies are general rules applied in the system. They can be seen as tools to make the 






Access rights to specific 
data abjects are 
determined by abject 
attributes assigned to that 
abject, user identity, user 
attributes, and 
environmental conditions 
as defined by the security 
policy. 
Users must be held 
accountable for security-
relevant actions. 





that grant or deny access 
to objects usmg rules 
driven by attributes of the 
user ( such as user identity, 
group, etc.), attributes of 
the object (such as 
permission bits), type of 
access ( such as read or 
write ), and environmental 




requmng that users are 
held accountable for their 
actions, facilitating after-
the-fact investigations and 
providing some deterrence 
to improper actions. 
The organization will meet 
P.DUE-CARE 
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use of the organization's 
IT systems must comply 








The organization' s IT 
systems must be 
implemented and operated 
in a manner that represents 
due care and diligence 
with respect to risks to the 
organization. 
all requirements imposed 
upon it from the outside; 
for example: Government 
regulations, national and 
local laws, and contractual 
agreements. 
It 1s important that the 
level of security afforded 
the IT system be m 
accordance with what is 
generally considered 
adequate within the 
business or government 
sector m which the 
organization is placed. 
The policy are the first kind of "must implement" for a secure application. Security as 
some impact on privacy ("can the application store any information about his users?"), law 
("What kind of cryptography can the application use?"), internai company policy ("Access 
to this resource need to be restricted, even if it ' s not unsafe for the application"). 
c. Threats 
Examples of threats are: 
T.AUDIT-CONFIDENTIALITY-TOE: Records of security events under control of the 
TOE may be disclosed to unauthorized individuals or processes. 
TOE security depends in part on the ability of the TOE to detect and report the occurrence 
of security relevant events, to determine the identity of those responsible for such events, 
and to protect the event records from unauthorized access, modification, or destruction. 
T.AUDIT-CORRUPTED-TOE: Records of security events under control of the TOE may 
be subjected to unauthorized modification or destruction. 
T.CRASH-TOE: The secure state of the TOE could be compromised in the event of a 
system crash. 
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For the TOE to protect the information it controls, it must remain in a secure state, 
including after recovery from a system failure or discontinuity of service. 
System crash can occur with inadequate mechanisms for secure recovery. Data objects 
and audit information may be modified or lost and system software may be corrupted. 
As you can see, it remains large and could cover any kind of operating system (in fact 
those samples could fit non-OS product too). That's an important point about PP: they 
don't care about technical details. That's important for two things: The first is that it can be 
used and reused for any OS (so it could be used to compare OS), the second is that this 
document is understandable (up to a certain limit) by non-programmer, so PP can have 
some interesting for consumer, third party, ... 
3.5.3 Security objectives: how the TOE will address the threat. 
We now have a list of threats and policies that need to be addressed in our system. 
From that list, we will create a list of objectives. Assumptions will help us make "realist" 
objectives. 
Examples of objectives are: 
TOE Security Objective 
O.ACCESS-TOE: The TOE must 
provide public access and access by 
authenticated users to those TOE resources 
and actions for which they have been 
authorized. This will be accomplished 
with high effectiveness. 
O.ACCOUNT-TOE: The TOE must 
ensure, for actions under its control or 
knowledge, that all TOE users can 
subsequently be held accountable for their 
security relevant actions. This will be done 
with moderate effectiveness, in that it is 
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anticipated that individual accountability 
might not be achieved for some actions. 
O.AUTHORIZE-TOE: The TOE must 
provide the ability to specify and manage 
user and system process access rights to 
individual processing resources and data 
elements under its control, supporting the 
organization's security policy for access 
control. This will be accomplished with 
high effectiveness. 
NOTE: This includes initializing, 
specifying and managmg (1) object 
security attributes, (2) active entity 
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T.AUDIT-CONFIDENTIALITYTOE 
P.ACCESS 
From this example, you can see that those objectives are really based on the threat and 
policies. Because the purpose of this is to cover all threats and policiesies by an objective, 
we need to ensure that every threat/policy is addressed by an objective. It's like reading 
this table in the other orientation. Instead of having policy/threat related to objective, we 
need a list of objective related depending on threat/policy. Please note that this task could 
be easily automated, that's why a tool was developed to help in those tasks. (5.2 See 
SecGen-A helper to generate PP). 











Based on this simple sample, that's not enough, but if we look at our thread list, we 
have the threat T-CRASH-TOE. If we consider this thread we will get: 
T-CRASH-TOE NOTHING!! 
And that' s were it' s interesting; we get a fast view of uncovered threat. 
We now have some information about how to create objective list, and how to ensure 
they 're complete and coherent. We can also see from where problems may corne: if the 
threat or policy list isn't done correctly, everything can get wrong. Even worst, as we will 
see later, functional requirement will be wrong too. That's why threats/policiescies are a 
very important part of the common criteria. A tool can help, but it won' t make things 
correct. 
Please also note that outside that list, PP should contain rationale to explain the choices 
of the threats, policies and objectives. This will help reader understand why these threats 
exist, and if it' s relevant for them. 
3.5.4 Functional requirement 
From those objectives, PP writer will build a list of functional requirement. Of course 
CC doesn' t let us alone in this exercise, as we saw, CC define a list of class, subdivided in 
family , containing functional requirement. So the first step of a PP writer is to make his 
choice in all those possible requirements, determine how they address the objective, and 
then test if all the objectives are well covered. That explains how important are the 
objective in this construction. 
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Examples of functional requirements: 
Functional Required to help 
Component Name Dependency for address 
FAU GEN.1- Audit data Generation FAU GEN.2 O.ACCOUNT-TOE 
CSPP FAU SAR.1 O.RECOVER-TOE 
FAU SEL.1-CSPP O.RECOVER-






FAU GEN.2 User Identity O.ACCOUNT-TOE 
Generation 
FAU SARI Audit Review FAU SAR.2 
FAU SAR.3 
FAU SAR.2 Restricted Audit O.BYPASS-TOE 
Review 










From this table some questions may corne: 
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The first one is the meaning of FAU_ SAR.1 , as said previously our functional 
requirement are divided in classes, family and components. CC defines a notation for a 
component, to allow unique identification: 
FAU The class. 
FAU SAR The family. -
FAU SAR.1 The component. -
CC defines a rather complete list of class and family in order to help PP author, this full 
list can be found in the part 2 of the Common Criteria document. Again, software could 
help us here: we' re using rather structured informationinformation; a tool could present us 
this information in a clean way, so PP author will just "have to make their pick" . 
For instance, FAU_ SAR.1 is defined as: "audit review pro vides the capability to read 
information from the audit record". In clear: the program must provide a way to make the 
audit information visible to someone. 
The second question is about dependencies; dependencies are there to inform reader 
that some dependencies can 't be achieved if others aren't. In this sample: Restricted audit 
review can be achieved if audit review isn't possible. 
From this construct, we get: 
1. A list of functional requirements for our application do main. 
2. A way to prove they match our objective. 
3. A way to prove our objective matches our threats and policies. 
Please note that "prove" in this context doesn ' t mean that our application will be 
sec ure. We. W can prove our data are coherent, but we still need a correct list of threats and 
correct objectives related to those threats. That lead us to the conclusion that CC are a great 
help to make our app secure, but like any other kind of specification, they need lot of work 
to be correct. 
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3.5.5 Rationale 
All this construction seems to be build from almost nothing. We'veW a coherent 
structure, but nothing to argue about his content. That's why protection profile contains a 
rationale section. In this section, PP author will have to argue on their choice, so the PP 
reader will be able to understand why this threat exist, why it's covered by this specific 
objective and how the objective is implemented by those functional requirements. 
However because name and details about each policies, threats and objectives are quite 
understandable, it' s often not needed to rationale all of the choice made during the 
auythoring of the PP. 
3.6 Security Target (ST) 
PP and ST are pretty close; the main difference is that ST focuses on one specific TOE 
(system, subsystem, software) where PP tries to cover more. ST and PP are structured in 
the same way, but aren't really authored in the same way. 
ST is build from one or more PP, so the process is a bit different, you take one or more 
PP, choose what's relevant for your product, and you'll get your ST. 
The resulting document is almost the same, the only difference is that the PP targets a 
range of product (a domain) and the ST addresses a specific product. The section most 
likely to change will be the rationale section: we will have more elements to argue on our 
choice, so the ST can be more specific and precise. 
3. 7 Assurance approach 
Until now, we've focused on a list of possible threats, a list of objectives that need to be 
reached against those threats and in the end a list of functional requirements to achieve 
those objectives. It would be naïve to think that it would be enough to avoid any attack 
against a system, but it can give us some assurance about our system. This part will focus 
on how to develop and test our system to get some assurance aboutit. 
Common criteria proposes evaluation in order to get some information about our 
system security. security. From the CC document, we get: 
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Evaluation has been the traditional means of gaining assurance, and is the basis of the 
CC approach. Evaluation techniques can include, but are not limited to: 
a) Analysis and checking of process(es) and procedure(s); 
b) Checking that process( es) and procedure( s) are being applied; 
c) Analysis of the correspondence between TOE design representations; 
d) Analysis of the TOE design representation against the requirements; 
e) Verification of proofs; 
f) Analysis of guidance documents; 
g) Analysis of functional tests developed and the results provided; 
h) Independent functional testing; 
i) Analysis for vulnerabilities (including flaw hypothesis); 
j) Penetration testing. 
The CC philosophy (and the obvious one, generally accepted) asserts that the more 
effort you put in testing, the more your assurance about your system will be accurate. The 
effort is a vague notion; it can be greater or lower depending on the following criteria: 
• Scope: what part of the system will you take in consideration? 
• Depth: how far you'll dig into your system? 
• Rigor: what kind of methodology you'll apply, how structural will your testing be 
done? 
As it was needed for functional requirement, some structure is needed to make the 
evaluation of our TOE security. Common criteria use the same organization for assurance 
related things than those used for functional requirements: In other words: class, family 
and component. 
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ln the next sections of this document, we will spend some time on some of the 
"assurance related classes". 
Assurance Class Assurance Family Abbreviated Name 
ClassACM: CM automation ACM AUT 
Configuration CM capabilities ACM CAP -
management CMscope ACM SCP -
Class ADO: Deliveiy Delivery ADO DEL -
and operation Installation, generation and start-up ADO IGS -
Functional specification ADV FSP 
High-level design ADV HLD 
Implementation representation ADV IMP 
ClassADV: TSF intemals ADVINT Development -
Low-level desi~1 ADV LLD 
Representation correspondence ADV RCR -
Security policy modeling ADV SPM 
Class AGD: Guidance Administrator guidance AGD ADM -
documents User guidance AGD USR -
Development secm-ity ALC DVS -
ClassALC: Life cycle Flaw remediation ALC FLR 
supp01t Life cycle definition ALC LCD 
Tools and techniques ALC TAT -
Coverage ATE cov -
Class A.TE: Tests 
Depth ATE DPT -
Functional tests ATE FUN - · 
Independent testing ATE IND - · 
Covert channel analysis AVA CCA 
Class AVA: -Misuse AVA MSU 
Vulnerability 
Strength of TOE security functions A.VA SOF assessment -
Vuh1erability aualysis AVA VLA 
3.7.1 PP and ST evaluation 
The first step is to make sure the things we want to evaluate are coherent with 
themselves, so we have to test our PP and ST specification with themselves. This part was 
partially considered in the section Security objectives: how the TOE will address the 
threat.. 
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To evaluate PP and ST, Cornmon Criteria proposes 2 classes, one for the PP (called 
APE for "assurance profile evaluation") and for the ST ( called ASE for "assurance security 
target evaluation"). Because PP and ST are really close, with a different scope, the two 
classes are almost the same. 
a. Assurance profile evaluation (APE) 
Class Family Abbreviated Name 
Protection Protlle, TOE description ... i\PE DES -
Class APE: Protection Profile, Security environment ... i\PE ENV 
Protection -Protection Profile, PP introduction APE INT Profile -
evaluation Protection Profile, Security objectives APE OBJ -
Protection Profile, IT security requirements APE_REQ 
Like any CC class, APE is divided into some components; the following table contains the 
list ofthose components 16• 
The cornmon criteria specification provide a full description of each of those family , 
the important point, is that a "correct" PP, must fulfil all those family, so it must have: 
• A correct TOE type description (a PP about operating system has first to describe, 
"What's an operating system in this document"). 
• A coherent description of the environment. 
• An introduction describing the PP to allow classifying, identifying it easily. 
• The PP contains a list of objective, with their rationale, the objectives are coherent 
with thread and allow countering them. 
• The PP must contain a list of requirement, coherent with the objective; they must 
fully cover the objectives. 
In other words, a PP must have the structure described in Protection Profile (PP) 
16 This list is correct if the PP doesn' t contain extemal requirement, if it has, a new family need to be take 
in consideration (APE _ SRE). 
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Secunty Target, TOE descnptlon 
Security Target, Security environment 
Security Target, ST introduction 
Security Target, Security objectives 
Security Target, PP daims 
Security Target, 1T security requirements 
Secm·ity Target, Expliritly stated IT 
security requiremt>nfs 










Most of the families for PP and ST are the same, so we will focus on the differences. 
• ASE PPC: The ST must be a correct instantiation of the PP. Most of the ST is 
based on one or more PP, so it's necessary to check if the ST gives the same 
assurance about security than the PP did. If not, either the ST must not claim to be 
based on this PP, or the ST need to be modified to instantiate the PP. 
• ASE TSS: The ST shall contain a definition of the TOE, and make relationship 
between functional requirement and TOE features . As said before, that's the 
"rationale" section that needs to take the specific product in consideration instead 
of a generic, theoretical product. 
With those different steps, we get some assurance that our PP is correct. Therefore, we 
have a clean working basis for the rest of our evaluation. 
3.7.2 Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) and other assurance related 
classes 
At this stage, we have got a list of functional requirement that match objectives and 
those objectives match threats. And we've some assurance that our 
threats/objectives/functional requirements are coherent. 
To get some more assurance about our system, we can perform two kinds of operation: 
• Process related: how to develop, how to maintain, how to deliver, etc . . . 
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• Test related: perform test on our TOE to ensure that it performs well, even when 
misused. 
Those operations can be applied up to a given depth. This depth will determine how 
« good » our assurance investigation was, it will be translated in the EAL level (from 1 to 
7). 
Common Criteria defines 7 classes to cover the way development process, 
maintenance, test, documentation, product lifecycle, vulnerability assessment and product 
modification are done. Each of those classes is subdivided into various families and 
components. The following table contains the required components for each EAL level in 
each class. So an EAL can be seen as a bag containing various components from the 
available families. Sorne "standard" EAL are defined by common criteria and named 
EAL 1 to EAL 7. There is, of course, still a possibility to create a "custom EAL", in fact, 
that' s commonly used when a product meets EAL3 requirement, but also some of EAL4 
requirements (they are EAL3 compliant enriched by some EAL requirements). 
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Assurance Components by 
Evaluation .t-\.ssurance Level 
EALl EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7 
ACM A UT : tal..:i!i F- •· •=~ ~~~= -~ 1 1 2 ClassACM: ~ ~ .~-·-- ,, 2 
5 
3 
Configuration ACM CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 
management ACM sep , · 1%. 1 2 3 3 
'--"6~ f--------f----==----4 ";Jtf, 











ADO IGS l 1 1 l 1 l 1 
ADV FSP 1 1 l 2 3 3 4 
ADV RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 
ADV SPM 1 3 3 3 
AGD ADM 1 l l 1 1 1 1 
AGD USR l l 1 l 1 l l 
ALC DVS 1 1 1 2 2 
ALC FLR ,_ wi .,. 7Jl! ' * l'!f "' ,,.... ., '"' " r~ .,...,.,, '" :!' 1, - r 
ALC LCD 1 2 2 3 
ALC TAT 1 2 3 3 
ATE COV 1 2 2 2 3 3 
ATE DPT 1 1 2 2 3 
ATE FUN 1 1 l 1 2 2 
ATE IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 
Class AVA: AVA MSU . * ,.: 1;,,0 ::. .., 1 2 2 3 3 Vulnerability ------------···, ___________________ _ 
assessment A V A SOF ~ ~,4ii+ ~ 1 1 l 1 1 l 
AVA VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4 
a. Assurance configuration management (ACM) 
Today, no software is made from scratch, all developers use tools. From the 
compiler/linker up to the source management system, the case tools, the packaging tools, 
any tools can be of some help in software development. Two problems can corne from this 
fact: 
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• The tool we use can make our TOE less secure (a bug or feature of the compiler 
that will let potential cracker know more information about our software, like fixed 
memory address, etc.). In fact, we can't be sure our tools are safe17• In the real 
world, no development group can imagine write all the tools they'll use18, therefore 
we've got to have some trust in our tools. 
• Lot of modifications can be done to our TOE (generally the program sources), ifwe 
want our software to be safe; we need a way to control what happen to our TOE19 . 
We need to be able to track all change that can affect the TOE generation process. 
CC defines a class to address this development process related issue: ACM -
Assurance configuration management. 
The ACM class defines many families that should help people ensure that their TOE is 
generated from « safe sources», that versioning is coherent and complete. This process can 
be partially or totally automated and that's this level of automation that determine the EAL 
level (the most automated is considered as the most secure). 
b. Delivery and operation (ADO) 
A system can be totally secure, if we don't ship the right version (or a complete 
version), nothing can be assured. Note that it' s also true for other requirement. Therefore 
it' s very important to have a formalized packaging and delivery method. The requirements 
needed to achieve this objective are described in the class ADO. 
This class tries to cover all aspect of product delivery, from documentation to the 
prevention of modification after the product was considered complete. 
17 For more information about "tool trusting" see http://www.albion.com/security/intro-18.html#pgfld-
447197 and http://www.acm.org/classics/sep95/. 
18 And even in this scenario, it would need lot of development, so it would imply some trusting between 
the teams. 
19 As an illustration of this fact: in November 2003 a security flaw was introduced in the Linux kemel 
sources. The "bug" was rather hard to discover, but it was discovered with the help of CYS tracking tools. 
Without such tracking tools, this modification could have lead to an important security hole. 
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c. Development (ADV) 
Security can't be achieved without the implementation of the « target security 
function ». The class ADV focuses on this development. It's based on a top-down 
approach, starting from the functional requirement produced by the ST up to the 
implementation, with various intermediate level of specification: 
• TOE summary specification 
• Functional specification 
• High-level design 
• Low-level design 
• Implementation representation 
CC allows three specifications style: informa!, semiformal and formai. The style will 
determine how ambiguous will our assurance about the TOE be. It will also determine the 
EAL level associated with our TOE. 
CC defines those 3 styles as: 
• Informa!: written in natural language, the only real rules to follow are the spelling 
and grammar of the language used (that can be any language). Informai 
specification should also define the terms used in the specification according to the 
context. 
• Semiformal: Semiformal specifications use a restricted language (a subset of the 
natural language, for instance semiformal specification may force the use of some 
sentence structure). A semiformal specification can also be partially diagrammatic 
(data-flow diagram, state transition diagram, etc . . . ). 
Formal: Formal specifications are written using a commonly accepted formal language 
(mathematical language), with some informa} explanatory information. There need to be 
evidence that it is impossible to derive contradictions, and all rules supporting the notation 
need to be defined or referenced. In short: it' s the safest specification, it can' t be 
contradictory and it can be proven. 
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Determining how to create specifications is out of the scope of this document, and out 
of the scope of the CC itself. The important information is that we must be able to "trace 
down" our specification from the most generic (functional requirement) to the 
implementation, to ensure that our irnplementation really irnplements the security 
functional requirements. Like for specification, this correspondence can be done using one 
of the three styles and again, the most formal is considered as the most secure (but also the 
most complex and time consuming). 
CC provides some families that formalize the concept of "having the specification" and 
"tracing down the specification" and once performed give some assurance about our TOE 
implementations. This part could also be applied for other domains (not security related), 
we can use this to prove our software implement the needed requirements, no matter if 
they're security related or not. 
Those assurance requirements can have a great impact of development methodology. 
Generally a development methodology will include some assurance regarding the quality 
of the product from a "functionality" point of view. Lot of work can be done in this part to 
make the existing QA fit the security assurance level requirement. 
d. Guidance document (AGD) 
As we've seen earlier, lot of security attack are avoidable, they result from 
misconfiguration, improper use or not updated software. To help address those issue, a 
correct documentation is needed, both addressed to administrator (How to configure the 
system to be secure?) and to user (How to use the system in a secure way?). 
The class AGD focus on both user and administrator documentation. This 
documentation should explain in a « human readable » form how to address security issues 
related to the system. The respect of this requirement ensures that the product cornes with 
correct documentation. 
Again this requirement should be take in consideration with the product documentation 
(not related to security), in order to make the process more efficient, they are chance that 
the product will contains a single documentation, so it' s important to write the 
documentation with consideration for security concepts. 
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e. Lite cycle support (ALC) 
Because security is a critical domain, that has impact of lot of aspect of the product. lt' s 
important to take security in consideration from the beginning. It' s important to perform 
some control on the TOE during its development. 
A software product is almost never a finished product: bug fix, new feature may corne 
after the product was released. Like for development process, it' s important to consider 
security during those enhancements. 
The class ALC focuses on control and discipline in the development process and 
maintenances activities. 
Life cycle support isn' t specific to security, the important point to remember here: think 
about security when modifying the software, when a patch will be released, etc. 
f. Tests (A TE) 
When asking "how to be sure the product works?" the easiest answer is "Test it! ". For 
security, it's basically the same answer. We need to test our software if we want to give 
some assurance about its security. The A TE class requires the product to be tested 
( coverage, depth, functional) . 
Test, of course, doesn' t apply only to security, so again it's important to take the 
current testing methodology in consideration before performing the test. Performing this 
requirement, like lot of other requirements, will often be an integration of security in the 
existing specification/QA/testing process of the development/maintenance. 
It' s even more important for testing, because lot of test will get some influence from 
the security functionality implemented in the TOE. For instance if we added user login to 
ensure security, some test will need the user to login. lt has two consequences, the first: it's 
useless to add a specific "correct login test", it' s implicit. The second one: the other test 
needs a user login to be done, so they ' re slightly modified. lt seems obvious, but this 
simple example shows us that security testing cannot be made totally independently from 
the rest of the test. 
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An important point about testing (security testing and other testing) is that it' s often 
better to make a third party ( can be interna} to the company or extemal, but not the feature 
developer) to perform the testing. For security related issues, some companies are 
specialized in security testing. It has two advantages: 
• The developer, that's a human fact, does impact testing: we develop the software 
the way we thought it may be used, and we test it the same way. A third party tester 
will not be impacted by the development process and thus can provide better 
testing. 
• From a marketing point of view, it's often better to be able to claims that an 
extemal company has tested our software. That's also one of the roles of common 
criteria: have some extemal references for security claims. 
g. Vulnerability assessment (AVA) 
Any system can be abused, no matter how we pay attention to security m our 
development; a system can still contain flawa. It cannot be avoided, but we can get an idea 
about the possible attack that our system may encounter. For a good security level it' s also 
important to document those possible flaws in order to get a fair view of the system's 
security. 
For instance a common vulnerability is the strength of the encryption used, how long 
will a brute force attack take to crack a password? How does it depend of the password 
length? That's a very important question, because it will give idea about how long data can 
be considered as safe. If an application uses encryption that can be cracked in 60 days, the 
users need to know that they can't use the system to safely store data that are valid longer 
than 60 days. 
The CC propose to analyze the possible information flaw exploit (where does the 
hacker will « get into the system » ), and like other assurance requirement, it can be done 
more or less formally, and it will determine the EAL level claimable by the TOE. Next step 
is to analyze misuses of the TOE. The main objective is to disallow an administrator to 
configure it in an insecure way making users believe it' s secure. So developers must 
remove ambiguities in the software (see ADV) and documentation (see AGT). 
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The last step of this class 1s stress testing the security. Trying to abuse the system 
(intemally, or extemally20) 
20 Sorne companies even go further, they propose a system on a network and ask pirate to get into it, with 
a prize for the first one who succeed. Of course it's more a marketing operation ("see how it's secure, 2 
months and still not hacked!") than a vulnerability assessment operation, but it can still be helpful to get 
assurance about the product. 
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4 Example 
We'll make a sample common criteria PP in order to get a more precise idea of what it 
can be. First of all, we will try to describe on what kind of product the PP will apply then 
we will expose the threats, objectives, policies and requirements associated with this 
domain. 
4.1 Usage mode/ 
Océ, one of the leaders of the outputware market defines three main "usage models" for 
his output management software. We will use them as the basis for our sample PP. 
Because these "usage models" all concem the same kind of activity and are rather close to 
each other, we will only consider one PP, with some additional information highlighting 
the differences between the models. 
4.1.1 Overview of usage model 1: Office printing 
When people think about printing, generally the first idea that cornes in mind is printing 
a document, they've realized with a word processor. Hitting the "print button", then they 
expect to get their document printed on some printer in their office. 
That' s the first usage model "office printing". In the Océ context, the main differences 
is that it doesn' t print directly on the printer, but on a dedicated server, this dedicated 
server will perform some more task, like choosing the appropriate printer ( depending on 
the current load of the printer, the document size and format, the capability, the available 
printers, their locations, etc.). 
After that the user goes to the printer and takes his document. This simple fact leads us 
to an important point about security: the weakest link, our software can be as secure as 
possible, if the document is confidential, the biggest threat is physical: how could we avoid 
somebody to steal a document printed by another worker? 
From this fact, we can derive some information about office printing security: 
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• The software can't efficiently address threats related to data stealing. The company 
needs to be able to control who has access to the printers and when, and it's outside 
the scope of this document. Sorne printers also provide functionality to force a user 
to be present and enter some password when he wants to print his document (thus 
printing becomes a two step process: print the document from his software then ask 
the printer to print his document). 
• Data corruption/modification can and need to be addressed by software. We need to 
get assurance that the document printed is the document that the user wanted to 
print. 
• The dedicated server should be able to identify who is printing, in order to have a 
control over the resources used by this user. This is mainly to avoid abuse of 
consumable resources. 
4.1.2 Overview of usage model 2: Document production center 
Another way people approach printing, is via "copy shop", and other dedicated 
business. People format their document in a suitable format (postscript, PDF, ... ) and 
cornes to a specific place to get their document printed (it can be done via floppies, CDs, 
intranet, internet, ... any suitable transport medium). It often involves larger document, 
higher number of copies, and need faster printer. An operator is needed to configure the 
printing and control it. 
This is the second usage model for Océ outputware, called Document Production 
Center (DPC). 
The main differences with Office Printing are: 
• Need of an operator. 
• Larger document. 
• Higher number of copies. 
• Faster printing (100-200 page per minute) 
From a security point of view, it has some differences: 
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• There are third parties (company's internai or external) involved in the printing, 
and again it can be the weakest link. More control is needed if the documents are 
confidential (specific contract, etc ... ), again it's not software related. 
• Data corruption can occur in two places: from the document source to the operator 
and from the operator to the printer. This issue can be addressed (partially) by 
software if the document is transported via a network. 
• An important aspect to consider is the nature of the document. Large printing are 
often dedicated to a larger audience, therefore they are often less "private" or 
"confidential" than document in the Office Printing usage model. 
• User identification is also needed, but can be addressed differently if the transport 
medium implies human contact. (There is less need for secure user identification if 
he needs to corne personally to the operator, but the current trends are of course to 
subrnit electronically via some network or Internet). 
• The cost of security flaw can be higher: if a user abuses the system to get large 
amount of copies printed, it can involve bigger cost. (More consumable used). On 
the other side, the presence of the operator guarantees some permanent control over 
the system. ("Why is this printer printing 20.000 copies of the same document?"). 
4.1.3 Overview of usage model 3: Electronic data processing 
The last approach to printed document is the one everybody knows, even people that 
never touch a computer: large printing performed by companies, govemment, etc .. . 
Everybody received taxes notification, assurance related document, or even advertising. 
These kinds of printing are generally made on the biggest printer. 
This third usage model is called "Electronic data processing". It has some important 
differences with DPC: 
• Even larger amount of printed document 
• Each copy 1s often customized. (It's not more a single PDF submitted by an 
author). 
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• No implicit operator. (The document goes from the application to the EDP, with 
some transformation performed by filters, it's a largely automated process). Of 
course on such big system, a "production operator" is needed to control the printer, 
but he doesn't have to submit each copy to the printer, like in the DPC model. 
• Printers are able to print more quickly. 
From a security point of view it' s the most complex model, first of all there is a 
client/server configuration that perform complex task, without the implicit presence of an 
operator. Document are customized, therefore often contains persona! information (from a 
list of name address, up to the more persona! information like media! result). 
If we look at the existing threat more deeply: 
• Data need to be secure during all the processes; no modification or even reading of 
data could be done during the process. On the other side this process will most 
likely stay local to the printing company, network access will stay local and print 
server won't be exposed to the whole intranet. It will help the software address all 
network related threat, because the possible attacker can be easily controlled. 
• If someone corrupts the data it can be very time consuming ( thus expensive) to re-
achieve the operation. Unlike other domains that don't have material output, a 
system reboot or software operation can't be enough. 
• Reliability is very important; if the system becomes unavailable it will almost 
always have great impact on the company work. "Peoples don't print for fun. " 
• Because lot of preprocessing is done by the outputware on the document, and 
following the simple rule of the "weakest link", all those filter need to be fully 
secure. Their flaws will have an impact on the whole process. 
• Because of the important resource used in this kind of printing, correct client 
application identification need to be performed on the server in order to avoid 
printing from "unofficial" sources. 
54 
Security issues for software products 
• Because of the great complexity of this kind of printing, it' s reasonable to assume 
that administrator that are behind those system have a correct knowledge of the 
system. In theory, the software doesn't need to cover "beginners related issue", like 
automatic software updating, software update notification, etc ... 
4.1.4 Common overview 
From those overviews, we can extract some resemblance from the three usage models: 
• All the usage models address printing, that is obvious, but it has some impact on 
security, for instance the weakest link will often be once the document is outs ide 
the system. 
• Every configuration as some server/client architecture, even the most simple. 
• User differentiation is needed in all models in order to prevent resource abuse. 
• Cryptography can be needed for privacy, even for office document printing (avoid 
"out of the office" data stealing). 
The main differences are on three levels: 
• The customization applied on the document: in order the complexity of the filter. 
From a simple « change paper format » in Office Document Printing, up to the 
most complex « bill calculation algorithm » in EDP model. 
• The amount of printed page. 
• The length of the process 
• The presence of an operator. 
The similarity will allow us to get a « common PP » for our development. And the 
differences will force us to consider some differences in the policy and assumptions that 
we can apply to the system. 
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It ' s also very important to note that printing is nothing ... without a document. The need 
for security in such applications are really determined by the importance of the documents, 
it will almost always be a big problem if documents get modified during printing, but it can 
be more or less important if the document can be consulted by an unauthorized third party 
( depending if the document contains persona! data or not, etc ... ). In our development, we 
will consider « normal document », in other word the kind of document that we get 
everyday from public to confidential, but not specific or rare document like we could 
found in critical environment like nuclear power plant. 













In our development, we will consider those 4 documents: 
Privacy 
confidential 
• Document like this one: predisposed to office printing. We could imagine print 
them in a document production centre. It' s neither confidential neither targeted to 
large distribution. 
• Interna} corporate document, like product specification, bug reports, market study. 
Those documents are confidential but have a very small audience. That's also the 
kind of document that would apply for Document Right Management. 
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• Advertisement/newspaper: generally they ' re targeted to large audience, the 
document itself isn't confidential, but the filter applied on them can involve some 
personal information (name, postal address . . . ). Generally one single instance of a 
filtered document will have no value, but if someone gets access to the whole 
address list, it' s a more important threat. 
• Bill or taxes related document: Those documents are largely distributed, but are 
confidential. A single instance of a document can be relevant from the view of a 
private. (« What's the salary ofthis guy who seems to be friend of my boss? »). 
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5 Protection Profile 
5. 1 Generating protection profile 
Generating a protection profile from scratch is not an easy task, what kind of threats to 
consider, what objectives could be applied to map those threats, etc. The common criteria 
specification provides some help with a sample Protection Profile. Therefore we can start 
with a list of threats and objectives to cover a generic scenario. For our PP we will start 
from those criteria and modify them to fit our usage model. This is the usual way to create 
a new protection profile: build it from another one and because the Common Criteria 
committee provides one, we are using it. 
Because the task of managing list is rather structured and easy to perform with 
appropriate software. Therefore a software was developed to help in the first draft 
generation. 
5.2 SecGen - A helper to generate PP 
SecGen was build to ease the task of writing the sample PP that cornes with the thesis. 
Basically writing a PP consists of writing some list of threats, policies, objectives and 
functional requirements. The problem cornes from the fact that all those items need to be 
coherent. That's the basic idea beyond this tool: helping author having coherence feedback 
on their PP. 
5.2.1 Software features 
Before thinking about the implementation we first have to clarify the mmrmum 
required feature for the tool. Because it' s an internai tool developed for helping us in 
writing protection profile we are rather free on the choice of features. The conclusions of 
this reflection produced the following feature list: 
• Edit list of threats, objectives, policies, assumptions and functional 
requirements using a modem windowed interface. In this context editing means: 
add items, remove items and modify items. 
• Use an existing protection profile as the basis for a new one. 
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• Open format potentially usable by other software. This choice was made for 
interoperability with existing requirement software (for instance TestDirector de 
Mercury Interactive used by OSL). 
• Run at least under windows operating system. 
• Provide clear feedback about detectable incoherencies in protection profile and 
security target. Detectable incoherencies are: 
o Uncovered threats (no objective or assumption match the threat) 
o Uncovered policies (no objective or assumption match the policy) 
o Functional requirement that doesn't correspond to an objective 
( unneeded requirement) 
o Objectives that do not cover any threats or policy (unneeded objectives) 
o Assumptions that do not cover any threat or policy (unneeded 
objectives). 
• The ability to generate report in a rich open format usable in common word 
processor (at least Microsoft® Word). 
• Allow easy extension of the application to add new feature (Sorne possible 
extension are detailed in 5.2.5 Future development) 
5.2.2 Technical choice 
Based on this feature list, we decided to use some specific technologies to help us in 
our development. 
The tools was developed usmg Microsoft .NET framework and the C# language. 
Micrsoft.NET was used because it allows correct performances on high end machine, easy 
debugging, and usable performance on low-end machine and low development time. The 
Visual Studio .NET IDE was used in order to ease the development. This 
language/platform choice was made against other possibility mainly for the following 
reasons: 
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• Java was rejected because the development machine only contains 128Mb of 
RAM. 
• Native languages like C++ are generally more error prone and require higher 
development time. 
• Visual Basic was rejected because it doesn't offer correct performance in some 
scenario and doesn't allow a good 00 design. 
XML was used as the serialization format. This choice allows us to take profit of 
existing technologies to produce the output report in (X)HTML format and because it' s 
one of the best format to allow future interoperability with other software. 
The software was developed using a spiral development methodology: starting from a 
first version allowing with only a subset of the feature then adding more functionality. This 
choice was made because the software is heavily data-driven therefore most of the 
specifications of the software are inspired in the Common Criteria specification. 
5.2.3 Software architecture 
Based on the required feature and our technical choice, we are now able to think about 
the actual design of the application. One important fact is that data structure must be 
mapped to common criteria; therefore the design is heavily data-driven. The following 
schema represent the class diagram for non GUI related part of the software. 
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·;,• SecAssumptionQ 
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SecRepository 
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i . ':" f Policies 
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All the PP items class inherits from a Secltem class, this class is responsible for 
database and XML serialization. Each item has a unique ID. SecRepository is a special 
class allowing subitem, this class is needed to allow the hierarchy structure of functional 
requirement. SecPP is the global class that hold the current protection profile ( or security 
target), it contains list of assumptions, functional requirements, objectives, policies and 
threats. A SecPP instance can serialize itself (includes his list of items) in XML format (see 
Annex D for a sample XML file produced by SecGen). 
For GUI related part, it's a direct implementation using the limited RAD capability of 
Visual Studio.NET. 
The Protection Profile generation is made using an XSL stylesheet (see Annex E), the 
output is an XHTML document importable in Microsoft® Word and various other word 
processor. 
5.2.4 Tools presentation 
Based on this design an implementation of tools was produced. Next figure represent 
various screenshot of the software editing objectives, threats and policies. 
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The user has the ability to add or remove items from those list, and select which one are 
relevant for his own protection profile or security target. Sorne items may appear in red 
(grey on printed version) because they have coherencies problems: for instance in the 
second screenshot two threats appear in red because they are uncovered threats (no 
objective match them). 
5.2.5 Future development 
The idea beyond this tool was to help the task of writing a specific PP for a specific 
document. But the tool was designed to be extensible. Future functionality could be: 
• Global modification of a PP (merge, differences, etc ... ), because a clean XML 
document is used as serialization format, this is easy to implement. 
• Integration with other tools, for instance "test case" could be generated for some 
functional requirements. The XML format used should allows use to make easy 
interoperability operation with third party tools. 
• More authoring feature, for now the software only produce list of items. Sorne tools 
to add text around those lists could be helpful (add an introduction, conclusion, 
comments ... ). 
• ST development: ST document have the same structure, but they are more TOE 
specific. That gives us the opportunity to add more functionality related to an actual 
development, for instance language and technology considerations. 
5.3 Rationa/e for protection profile 
Protection Profile is specified by the Common Criteria specification; therefore they are 
formatted according to their specific format (list of items). However because the purpose 
of this sample is to show the application of a subset of Common Criteria on a specific 
domain, more rationale will be given for the various choice, especially threats. 
They are some important factor to take in consideration when reading the sample 
protection profile: 
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• It' s a protection profile not a security target. The main consequence is that the 
protection profile needs to address a generic class of product and that they are no 
specific implementation to take care of. That also means that some assertion needs 
to be made on the future TOE. For instance: we will consider that the future TOE 
will use cryptography, that some kind of user authentification is needed, etc. ( see 
Annex B. for a more complete description of those assertions). The advantage of 
this approach is that future ST author will be able to take the relevant part for their 
specific application without having to add lot of new threat or objective related to 
the technology they use. It' s also a required step: without any assertion on the 
future TOE no threats could be extracted. 
• Because Protection Profiles are fully described by Common Criteria, we choose to 
use the provided sample threat/objective/policies list. This choice was made for two 
reasons: first of all, the list was created by a specific committee of people with a 
great experience of security specification. The second is that various existing 
Protection Profile are written in the same way, this enforce many characteristic 
useful for anyone interested in PP: comparison with other Protection Profile, 
merging of many PP to make one ST, etc. On the other side, because Protection 
Profile vocabulary is generic, some explanations were added to describe why 
specific threats were choose and how they can exist in an "outputware" product. 
• For Protection Profile threats, the purpose is to prove that they can exist in the 
future TOE, not if they are more or less likely to happen of it they can be totally 
avoided using a specific TOE (for instance if the TOE is dedicated to a single user, 
all the multi-user consideration will probably be unneeded). 
5.4 The result 
As exposed in 5.2 SecGen - A helper to generate PP, the first draft of the Protection 
Profile was generated using our tools. Then it was edited to fit our specific application 
type. The development methodology for the PP was a "spiral development" : first draft was 
printed then analysed to discover missing threats or irrelevant threats. This review process 
was done many times in order to get a better protection profile. 
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In this context, "better" means that the protection profile will fit to the product domain. 
This phase is the most complex, we have to work on a generic inexistent product and we 
are not allowed to make to many claims about the future product. Lot of the decisions 
made about which threats, policies or assumptions to consider were made after some 
discussion with OSL employees. 
Because a protection profile is a rather large document consisting of various lists, it' s 
included as Annex C and not directly in this document. However, the experience gained by 
creating the protection profile is presented in this document. 
5.5 CC evaluation 
We have exposed common criteria; from this document we should now be able to 
understand how common criteria can be interesting (for coherences see 3.5.3 Security 
objectives: how the TOE will address the threat.). With the sample Protection Profile we 
have seen how Common Criteria list of threats, policies and objectives can fit in our 
sample applications. We will now explore some possible weakness or advantage of 
Common Criteria from a developer point ofview. 
5.5.1 A very good start 
The first important point is that our protection profile contains lot of threats and polices 
with the correspon~ g objectives. It is one of the advantages of Common Criteria and the 
way they are built Being able to take an existing Protection Profile and extend it to 
another product domain offer some guarantee that most of the possible threats are covered. 
We were able to identify some threat_5 that didn't seem applicable to our domain, 
sometimes about lot of reflection and talks. In some ways using the Common Criteria 
changed the way we needed to think about security threats. Sorne part of the reflection 
becomes "is this threat relevant?" instead of trying to list every possible threat. 
67 
Security issues for software products 
5.5.2 Frontier between security feature and other feature 
From the theory point of view, CC is coherent, logic and well documented. Starting 
from the assumption that nothing is perfect we should be able to ask some question about 
the relative independency of common criteria and the rest of the development. Sorne reader 
may have the feeling, based on this document, that security is seen like something apart, 
that' s not the case; it' s deeply linked to the rest of the development. That is one of the 
weakness of common criteria: it' s nature force it to be independent from the rest of the 
project (it' s about security not software development in general), but in reality the frontier 
between security feature and the rest of the application is a little more fuzzy (think about 
user management, is the login box a security feature or a simple part of the GUI? the code 
that make calculation based on the current user is part of security or not? What if data are 
frrst encrypted?). 
5.5.3 Another source of specification 
Another weakness is the way security target are build: they are derived from one or 
many protection profile, this seems logic and coherent but has one problem: The 
application specification are generally based on the client needs, that' s the root of all the 
specification ( even if someone the need are not expressed by the user directly but derived 
from his need), protection profile will add another root to the software specification. In 
other words: conflict between two choices of implementation will need more discussion to 
be resolved: will the user need be taken in consideration first or will the protection profile 
security requirement be considered. For instance: in our sample we have considered the use 
of cryptography, imagine that the user do not want any form of cryptography for some 
reasons (legal reasons for instance), this simple fact would invalidate lot of threats (and 
therefore objective, policies and functional requirement) in our PP. 
5.5.4 Differentiation of PP items .QwJ. 
(>- la / 
Another weakness of Common Criteria is that it' s only ist. That 1...:s the great 
advantage of being very structured and easy to read and build. On the other ail the threats 
( and other PP items) are on the same level. It could have been interesting to be able to 
mark some threats as very important. 
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For instance in the sample developed in Annex B, all the threats were on the same 
level, even if some were more probable than other. For instance, the 
T .Hack _ Crypto .Hack _ Crypto _ ChsnCy threat (" The attacker discover s an unknown 
encryption key.") is possible but very unlikely to happen with a modern cryptographie 
system. On the other side, threats like T.Dev_Flawed_Code.Dev_FC_Recovery ("A system 
failure may alter the behaviour of the system 's security functions in such a way that, upon 
recovery, if no longer properly enforces ifs security policy (TSP). ") are more likely to exist 
because they represent almost any possible bug in the software. 
One possible improvement of Common Criteria would be to add different level of 
threats (and objectives) to qualify the relevance of those items. That information could be 
useful for real software development; it would set priorities on development and testing 
allowing the software to cover quickly the most important possible security failure. 
lt's important to note here that Common Criteria already offers EAL to make some 
distinction between important and less important security related functionality. But the 
distinction is mostly made on the way to get assurance about the security feature on a 
product not on the feature themselves. 
5.5.5 Real interest of Common Criteria 
We should have more time to experiment the common criteria: test them on a real 
application, derive a complete Security Target from our sample Protection Profile, and test 
it in a real world application to see what kind of impact the use of Common Criteria has. 
Unfortunately we don't have enough time for that. 
Therefore questions about the real interest of common criteria remains open and will 
probably depends of those factors: 
• Existing development model. 
• Size of the application (like every specification, it's easier for smaller application). 
• Time allowed for the project. 
• Language and technologies used. 
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Sorne of those aspects are mentioned in section O.Another very interesting aspect of 
common criteria are the assurance level provided by the use of those criteria. Being able to 
sell a product that fit in a given EAL will give the client some assurance about the 
product' s security. It's relevant for the customers: they have more independent information 
about what they buy, it's relevant for the company that sells the software: they can prove 
their security clairns. 
l 
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Going further as future possible work. And that's were we are: we need more 
investigation to get an idea of the real impact of common criteria on a project, we have 
tried to show- that common criteria are helpful during the development in a "perfect 
context", some work need to be done to determine what happen in real life. 
5.5.6 PP/ST construction as a tree 
Protection Profile and Security Target are all based on threats, policies and assumptions 
as the root, and then objectives and functional requirements are building from those 3 
pillars. The problem with this approach is that there is no way using Common Criteria to 
test that the threats and policies are complete. A security target can get a good assurance 
level (see 3.7.2 Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) and other assurance related classes) 
without being complete. 
This problem is important of course, but also exists in any kind of specification: there is 
no way to efficiently test the coherence between client needs, applications correctness and 
actual development. 
5.5.7 Useful existing list of items 
Another fact that cornes from the sample PP is that most of the sample threats, 
objectives and policies apply to our case. Of course they need some interpretations and 
adaptation (because we are in a different context), but most of them are applicable and 
relevant. 
That seems rather logic: security feature are the same in lot of software, no matter what 
the software actually does cryptography technology, user authentification, audit 
management are the same (that also explain why there are so many development library 
dedicated to those domains: CryptLib, OpenSSL, Log4Net, Gina, ... ). 
5.5.8 Conclusion 
What remains after all , is that common criteria are a mature specification, resulting of 
lot of work from various people around the world, used in certification process to get real 
assurance about product. The common criteria are coherent, extensible and offer a rather 
interesting framework when we need specification about security of a product. 
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Another very interesting aspect of common criteria are the assurance level provided by 
the use of those criteria. Being able to sell a product that fit in a given EAL will give the 
client some assurance about the product' s security. It' s relevant for the customers: they 
have more independent information about what they buy, it' s relevant for the company that 
sells the software: they can prove their security claims. 
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6 Going further 
ôf 
Now, we should have some idea of what are Common Criteria and j.vJiy it can be 
interesting for product development from a security point of view. BecauseVsecurity, even 
restricted to "pre-attack" stage, is a very large topic, lot of works ca till ,9e done. This 
J . 
work can be a starting point for various extensions, including the following points. 
-~ ) 
Technical ~ppr5 
This document tried to be technology agnostic, of course, some assumptions need to be 
made, we are talking about computer, not something else, but no specific technology, 
language, platform was take in consideration. This fact can be an opportunity to dig more 
into specific technologies to see how they impact security development. For instance, 
based on document available on some platform (Java or .NET for instance) it may be 
possible that some of the functional requirement will be implicit, or will be implemented in 
a lot easier way. For instance, Microsoft .NET add the notion of trusted (or not) 
environment, to get some assurance about what an application can or can't do, buffer 
overflow impact are also different in such environment. Those concepts are not new but 
will probably change the way the software will be implemented, the impact of threat, 
objective and functional requirement during the development process. 
That is even more true in real world were no application can be 100% secure, 100% 
bug free, developers have to make trade off between time and correctness of their 
application. A study about the existing technology from a security point of view could give 
very relevant information for the choice of a technology for the development of a new 
project. It would be also helpful after the development to get a more precise idea of the 
remaining threats surrounding the application (see 3.7.2g. Vulnerability assessment). 
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6. 1 Development methodo/ogy 
Authoring a cornmon criteria related document is a task by itself, it should be integrated 
in the development process in a suitable manner and as already mentioned in Evaluation 
Assurance Level (EAL) and other assurance related classes (3. 7.2), Cornmon Criteria have 
some impact on other step of the development process (realizable feature, specification, 
testing, documentation, ... ). It can be relevant to dig more in this topic, for instance by 
starting from one or more « real » development process and investigate about « how to 
hook CC in the existing process ». 
lt wasn' t done in this document for two main reasons: 
1. There are hundred of development methodologies, proper to each company, team, 
developer, focusing on only a few methods would probably lead us to specific 
consideration instead of a generic theory based approach. 
2. Hooking CC into a development process need very good knowledge of a 
development process, that' s not an easy task and it is very time consuming. 
6.2 lmproved too/s 
The tool developed with this document is mainly a« helper » for PP/ST author, it help 
author by providing « mostly used default », but doesn't hook in a specific development 
methodology or existing product documentation, product testing or product development. 
Lot of work can be done on this side, but again it's a very large domain, impacting security 
and lot of other development aspect. 
6.3 Certification 
We have considered CC mainly from a developer point of view, but cornmon criteria 
are also widely used to give some assurance about a product. Therefore it can be 
interesting to dig more the certification process needed to get an EAL certification from a 
valuable third party. This work should be able to answer the following question: 
• What steps are needed to get a certification? 
• When does this need to be done? Can it be done after the product release? 
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• What are the cost and the benefits for such a certification? When does it become 
rentable? 
• Are certifications a « fair view » of the product? How accu.rate is an evaluation? 
6.4 Real impact on a project 
Another point that can lead to interesting conclusion would be a work about « real 
benefit » from a security point of view of common criteria; does it make software more 
secure? The question is easy to ask but answering this question is a real challenge. The 
author of such a document would need access to detailed information about various 
products developed with or without common criteria in mind, information about user 
feedback, development time, etc .. . It could be also interesting to make « bench », for 
instance by asking to developer of approximately the same level to develop the same 
product one with common criteria and one without. 
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7 Conclusion 
Based on this document, some conclusion can be taken about security in application in 
general, and the common criteria specification. It' s important to note again that because 
security is a very huge subject, this document only cover a small subset of security issues 
in software applications. 
First of all , we've explored the current market, two main ideas were exposed: security 
is needed, it' s not fiction, real threats do exist, and we need to something against those 
threats. Second idea is that security doesn' t seem to be the first concem of software 
vendor; they don' t advertise that much on security, the retained explanation was that 
security is seen as an implicit feature. Based on this study, the first partial conclusion is 
that we need security, and we need to do it well. One way to enhance security in an 
application is to use a development methodology for security related part of the 
application. 
The second part is the study of such a methodology. The methodology considered is the 
common criteria. The main reason of this choice is that it' s an ISO standard and the result 
of many country specific security methodology. -The sample Protection Profile help us to 
understand that Common Criteria is helpful to get a better view of security feature but also 
that it needs good integration in the rest of the development process. 
Lot of works can still be done to get a more precise idea of security in today ' s software. 
This document put some of the first element: security is needed and there are some helpful 
methodologies to achieve more secure products, one of the is Common Criteria. 
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Annex A: table of OS flaws . 
Annex B: A protection profile for outputware product. 
Annex C: Common Criteria abbreviations 
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Annex A: Security issues in operating systems per year 
os 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
AIX 21 38 10 15 6 
BSD/OS 7 5 4 1 3 
BeOS 0 0 0 5 1 
Caldera 4 3 14 28 27 
Connectiva 0 0 0 0 0 
Debian ... 2 31 55 28 .) 
FreeBSD 5 2 17 36 17 
HP-UX 9 5 11 26 16 
IRIX 28 15 9 14 7 
MacOS 0 1 5 1 4 
MacOS X Server 0 0 1 0 0 
Mandrake 0 0 2 46 36 
NetBSD 2 4 10 20 9 
Netware 1 0 4 3 1 
OpenBSD 1 2 4 17 14 
RedHat 6 10 47 95 54 
SCO Unix 3 3 10 2 21 
Slackware 4 8 11 11 10 
Solaris 24 33 34 22 33 
SuSE 0 1 23 31 21 
Turbo Linux 0 0 2 20 2 
Unixware 2 3 14 4 9 
Windows 3.lx/95/98 3 1 46 40 14 
Windows NT /2000 10 8 78 97 42 
htto ://www.securitvfocus.com/vulns/stats. shtml 
Annex B: Protection profile for "outputware" product 
The presentation of the TOE can be found in the main document. Because a Protection 
Profile covers a domains and not a specific product, we will focus on a generic 
"outputware product" that has the following characteristics (based on the presentation of 
the Océ usage model): 
All the usages models address printing, that is obvious, but it has some impact on 
security, for instance the weakest link will often be once the document is outside the 
system. 
Every configuration has some server/client architecture, even the most simple. 
User differentiation is needed in all models in order to prevent resource abuse 
("outputware" product need to know who print the document, even if the "who" is some 
group of users). 
Cryptography can be needed for privacy, even for office document printing (avoid "out 
of the office" data stealing). Because it's one of the most efficient way to protect data, we 
can assert that an outputware will use some sort of cryptography. 
Every usage model use the concept of privilege, some kind of user have administrator 
rights, some are simple user. In the most generic form: administrator and user could be a 
single entity in the application but they will always have different logical functions. 
Outputware application need a good auditing system in order to keep track of the state 
of every document (print queue state for instance). This audit feature can be used for 
security purpose. 
"Outputware" are real applications. They run on current hardware, with the known 
limitation of current hardware (possible flaw, speed, memory limitation, existing of 
overflows attack, etc.) 
Those characteristics will be used as rationale for the various threats applicable to our 
TOE. Before the threats list we first to formalize our assumption about the future TOE. 
,-
iName 
1. 1 Assumptions 
A.Ad.min Attitude 
-----------
A.Eavesdrop _ by _ Out 
A.Physical 
IA.Password _ Management 
A.Ad.min 
The administrator is considered as potentially hostile. He has good knowledge 
of the system functionality and the way to abuse the system. 
It can be a local or remote administrator. 
To consider the most generic case, we need to take in consideration porrly 
trained administrator to. The consequences will be that our threats will 
consider the admin as able to makes error and to abuse the system. 
Most of the time an "outputware" is separated from the rest of the network 
and not exposed to the rest of the world. We will consider this as the default: 
• TOE is not exposed to the internet. 
• Access is possible via the company's LAN. 
---
iToe fact that we are talking about printed output force us to put a very strong 
Jassumption here: 
• The TOE can't do anything once the document is printed. The 
company is responsible for this part of the security of the process. 
IAn assumption is made about password and other identification data. The 
TOE should provide correct guidance about the correct way to choose 
identification data to ensure TOE's protection. 
We consider that user won 't expose the identification data to third party. 
The TOE will run on existing operating system, the administrator is 
responsible for security issues related to the operating system and any other 
application running on the machines on which the TOE is executed. 
Admnisrtation include: virus checking, applying patch, configuring the 
operating system security to ensure that no other application can impact the 
TOE in an insecure way. 
1 --
,A.COTS 
··········1The TOË -i~constructed from near-term achievable, commercial off the shelf 
!(COTS) information technology. 
r~ Co~u:i:;mns 
1.2 Threats 
iin other word: it's actually realisable using current technologies. 
'securing the communication from a material/physic point ofview is out of the 
!scope of the TOE security. Correct protection of wire, router, switch, access 
ipoint must be guaranteed in order to ensure the secure state of the TOE. 
Sorne threats are relative to misuses from the users, some are more related to some 
specific attack ("hacker' s attack"). Rationale for those threats indicates why the threat is 
relevant with some specific information when needed. All the threats that fit in the 





T.Admin Err Commit.Ad 
,m _Err_ Crypto 
!An administrator misconfigures 
1cryptographic functions or stores 
lplaintext keys in insecure areas. 
1covered by 
r-Audit Account 
O.Crypto Key Man 
O.C!ypto Manage Rotes 
O.l&A User Action 
T.Admin Err Commit.Ad 
min_Err_AC_policy 
--------------
.An administrator's error in data 
,entry changes the access control 
!or information flow policy 
jenforced by the system in such a 
lway that it no longer serves its 
O. A dm in Guidance 
O.Security Attr Mgt 
O.Security Data Mgt 
jo.Security Func Mgt 
!O.Security Rotes 
5 
T.Admin Err Commit.Ad 
min Err Audit 
'T.Admin Err Commit.Ad 





ator's error in data 
s the audit behavior 
An administr 
entry change 
of the system 
auditing no 
intended purp 
in such a way that 
longer serves its 
ose. 





system in su 
longer serves 
mechanism of the 
ch a way that it no 
its intended purpose. 
1 
·--······ ...... ·-·-· ··-
-- --------- -
O.Admin Guidance 
O.Audit Admin Role 
O.Audit Loss Resgond 
O.Audit Protect 
O.l&A User 
O.Security Data Mg! 
O.Security Roles 
O.Adrnin Guidance 
O.Limit Actions Auth 
O.Security Data Mg! 
-·· -----·---·--- - ------- ····--··- --· --------
T.Admin Err Commit.Ad 
'min Err lnfo-
1T.Admin Err Commit.Ad 
,min Err Resource 
'T.Admin Err Commit.Ad 
min_Err_Sys_Entry 
,-- ----
IT.Admin Err Commit.Ad 
[min Err User Attr 
l - - -
T.Admin Err Omit.Adm 
lMisconfig_ User 





Adm Hstl Audit Dstr - - -
T.Admin_Hostile_Modify. 
Adm Hstl Mod Data AC - - - -
ator's error in data An administr 
entry makes 
information un 
system or application 
available. 
ator's error in data An administr 
entry makes system or application 
resources una vailable. 
_____ .... -· .. ---
ator's error in data An administr 
entry change 
policy of 
s the intended entry 
the system or 
application. 
An administr ator's error in data 
1es a user's security 






ppropriate under the 
cy of the system or 
A change in 
duties do n 
administrativ 
privileges an 
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O.Admin Guidance 
O.Priority Of Service 
O.Resource Quotas 
O.Security Data Mgt 
O.Security Roles 
O.Admin Guidance 
O.Security Attr Mg! 
····-· ---- -- --
O.Admin Guidance 
O.Security Data Mgt 
O.Admin Guidance 
O.Security Attr Mg! 
O.Securi!Y Data Mgt 
O.Security Func Mgt 
O.Security Roles 
O.User Attributes 








O.Audit Admin Role 
O.Audit Protect 
O.l&A User 
O.AC Admin Limit 
O.Audit Account 
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'5 (for instance: ail 
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' i adm in instrators). 
' 
,5 (an user is able to 
1do perform some 
1 !action that he 






5 (imagine the 
following scenario: 
!an employee get 
fired but he' s still 
able to get access 
, to printer queue) 
5 (the simple fact 
the the 












!Adm _ Hstl_ Mod _ SEP 
- -··=·-'>••·····"'"""'~- -- ··· ···-···~ 
T.Admin Hostile _Modify. -
'Adm Hstl Mod TSFCode - - -
i 
'T.Admin _Hostile_ Modify. 
!Adm Hstl Mod USB 
The administrator maliciously 
alters information flow control 
policy to allow information to 
flow to inappropriate locations for 
unauthorized users access or 
modification. 
An administrator or user 
masquerading as an administrator 
maliciously modifies system entry 
parameters which would allow 
unauthorized access to an 
organization's protected assets. 
.•• , •. -.- .. », 
The administrator modifies the 
security-critical (TSF) code to 
weaken the security effectiveness 
of the TSF or introduce a new 
security breech. 
The administrator modifies a 
user/subject binding which would 
allow a user to act on an object 
without creating an audit trail. 
1······················ 
5 (for instance: an 
administrator 




printer in a way 
that makes some 
O.Info Flow Ctrl Admin 
print in user 
another office) 
5,3 (this threats is 
part of the classic 
O.AC Admin Limit 
O.Aud Sys Entry Parms 
"pirate attack" as 
O.Audit Admin Role 
,some were exposed 
!in the first section 
O.I&A User 
!of the main 
!document) [Attack] 




O.Sys Self Protection 
O.TSF Mod Lirnit 
15,3 [Attack] 
O.Adm Limits Bindings 
-----·······,·· ..... ,., .. 
I
T.Admin_Hostile_Modify. 
Adm Hstl Mod UsrAttr - - -
jT.Admin _ U serPriv .Admin 









s _ CompFail_ Res 
The administrator modifies or 
mishandles the users attributes or 
roles which allows users, 
unauthorized or authorized, to 
have the ability to perform 
inappropriate actions or could 
prevent a user from performing an 
authorized action. 
An administrator aggregates 
information that indirectly reveals 
the identity (or other privacy 
related information) of user(s) in 
violation of user privacy policy. 
An administrator reads 
information collected by the IT 
system or product that reveals the 
identity ( or other privacy related 
information) of user(s) in 
violation of user privacy policy. 
• ,-,~ •••••,-w-
The TOE fails to provide adequate 
key management or operation due 
to failure of extemal 
jcryptographic support 







O.Crypto Extem Depend 
!System use uncovers a hardwar~ --- -
' O.Fail Secure 
l
flaw in a critical system 
component. 
··r········---·•--··· 
IA system allocates so many 
1resources that not enough are left 








T.Component F-a-il-u-re ___ So_ft __ lAn authorized user performs an 10 .Fail Secure 
!5,3 [Attack] 
!5,3,l (in this 
scenario private 
information will 





... ,-., .•....• 
:ware Flaw 
-T.Component_Failure.TSF 
;_Err_ Conf_ Crypto 
T.Dev Flawed Code.Dev - -
FC _ Attr _Interp 
operation or set of operations, 
exercising a software flaw in a 
security-critical component. 
The TSF accidentally releases 
sensitive plaintext data, red keys, 
or other cryptographie assets to an 
inappropriate audience. 
The security-critical (TSF) 
components inconsistently 
interpret audit data attributes 
exchanged with another trusted 1T 
product. 
O.Fault Tolerance 
O.Crypto Data Sep 
O.Crypto Dsgn Impl 
O.Crypto Key Man 
O.Crypto Modular Dsgn 
O.Crypto Operation 
O.Crypto Self Test 
O.Crypto Test Regs 
O.Fail Secure 
O.Secure State 
-------- - - -
O.lntegrity Attr Exch 
!7,4 
! 
ln this scenario the 
other 1T product 
are the operating 
system, the 
printer's software 
(drivers) and the 
software that 
produce the 
document that need 
to be print. 
--------~ "-~-· - --···-------..----------------------1 
IT.Dev_Flawed_Code.Dev_ 
lFC Buff Not Clr - - -
:T.Dev_Flawed_Code.Dev_ 
;FC Ctrl Data 
T.Dev Flawed Code.Dev - -
'FC_Data_Export 
T.Dev Flawed Code.Dev - -
FC _ Recovery 
T.Dev Flawed Code.Dev - -
FC Self Protect 
The system leaves user 
information in a system buffer for 
view by another unauthorized 
user. 
O.No Residual lnfo 
3, in this scenario 
user information 
can be last user that 
used a printed, 







iother application to 
A security-critical (TSF) 1actually produce 
component incorrectly modifies lsomething (the 
O.lnteg Sys Data Int 
control data regarding a user :operating system, 
process. 
-1. syste~i:correctly exchanges 
!




1A system failure may alter the 
'behavior of the system's security 
:functions in such a way that, upon 
recovery, it no longer properly 
lenforces its security policy (TSP). 
r - ....... ----~ .................. ___ .... _. 
-Software developer or hacker 
modifies system security functions 
O.Integ Sys Data Ext 
O.Secure State 
lü.Correct Operation 
lo.Sys Self Protection 
!the document 
iediting software, 
'etc ... ), this threat 
!need special 
:attention. 
,------- .. __ , 
!This threat 1s 
lrelevant because in 
· our context other 
:system can be the 
[printer software. 
;The output need to 
be same as the 
intended output. 
7, today 's hardware 
,need electricity, 
'this simple fact 
iforce us to think 
'about those kind of 
problem. 
[Attack] 
1T.Dev Flawed Code.Dev - - -
; FC _ Trap _ Door 
; 
jT.Dev _Flawed _ Code.Ext_ 
'Crypto_Failure 
; T.Failure _OS_ Comp.Failu 
·re DS Comm 
-------------
T.Hack AC.Hack AC Co 
ide Vul 
' -
T.Hack AC.Hack AC We 
ak 
T.Hack Avl Resource.Hac 
1k Comm Overload 
- -
T.Hack Avl Resource.Hac 
k Prcsr Overload 
,~~~~~~~~~ :in a Joss of security 
The system developer creates a 
secret back door in the system 
(TOE) that allows covert access 
by the developer. This allows the 
developer to collect information, 
monitor user actions, modify the 
operation of the TOE, or just 
make unauthorized use of the 
TOE. 
The TOE fails to provide adequate 
key management or operation due 
to failure of extemal 
cryptographie support 
Failure of a communications 
function severs communications 
between security-critical (TSF) 
components. 
The hacker can use vulnerabilities 
found in system or application 




The system access control 
mechanism(s) or user attributes 
are weak and can be broken or the 
implementation methods of the 
system access control causes the 
weakness. 
The unauthorized use of 
communication resources by a 
hacker causes a denial or delay in 
service to legitimate operations 
within the TOE scope of control. 
This would include the excess 
:bandwidth utilization, leading to 
ithe TOE's inability to perform it's 
1security functions. 
[I-Ia~ker causes system task 
1overload resulting in denial of 
'service. The system (TOE) has 
been over-tasked and can not 
complete the assigned tasking at 
all or in an expected amount of 
1time. The hacker invokes 
;processing functions in 
O.Audit Account 
O.Audit Admin Role 
O.Code Signing 
O.l&A User 
O.Source Code Exam 
O.Crypto Extem Depend 
[Attack] 
4 (note that this 
threat is different 
than 
T.Component_ Fail 
ure.Ext_ Crypto _Fa 
iilure that consider 
failure in extemal 
cryptography 
software, here we 
considered misuse 




O.Jntegrity Data Rep 
O.Trusted DS Recov 
0.Apply Code Fixes 
O.Audit Deter Misuse 




O.Data lmp Exp Control 
O.Hack Limit Sessions 
O.Hack Traffic Control 
O.Priority Of Service 
O.Resource Quotas 
0 .Audit Generation 
O.Hack Limit Sessions 
O.Hack Traffic Control 
O.Priority Of Service 
p .React Discovered Atk 
,0.Resource Quotas 
'2,7 
:3, this threat will 
:have impact on the 
tradeoff between 
lusability (how easy 
1it's to get the 
!document printed) 
:and security (how 
1to avoid anyone to 
iprint a document). 
7 ,2, 1 Lot of printer, 
!specifically large 
volume printers use 
"classic" network 
interface. [Attack] 
[Attack] 7, 1 ln our 
context, one of the 
critical resource 







!T.Hack _Av 1 _ Resource.Hac 




!T.Hack _ Comm _ Eavesdrop 
i. Hack CommEaves Eman -
'T.Hack Comm Eavesdrop 
1 - -
, .Hack CommEaves Intrc 
jT.Hack _ Comrn _ Eavesdrop 
t.Hack_ComrnEaves_ Tap 
T.Hack _ Crypto.Hack _ Cry 
1
pto_ChsnCy 
T.Hack _ Crypto.Hack _ Cry 
ipto _ ChsnPln 
c--------------
iT.Hack _ Crypto.Hack _ Cry 
!pto _ ChsnTxt 
'T.Hack _ Crypto.Hack _ Cry 
, pto _ Cypher 
--· ···-·-·-·--·· ·-·- ··--------··-····-· ·------·--· ··------·-·-··· ·--·--
association with unauthorized 
activity that leads to 
overburdening processing 
resources on the TOE. 
A hacker initiates processes that 
tax the amount of storage 
available in the system (TOE). 
Such would be the case when a 
hacker floods the TOE with e-
mails. 
An outsider uses special 
equipment to capture emanations 
off the communications line. 
An outsider who is not an 
intended recipient intercepts user 
data communications. 
-··- ·-·-· ·----·-·-·--····-··---···-- ··-·-·-·----·-· 
O.Audit Generation 
O.Guarantee Audit Stg 
O.Hack Limit Sessions 
O.Hack Traffic Control 
O.Manage TSF Data 
O.Priority Of Service 
O.Resource Quotas 
O.Data Exchange Conf 
O.Data Exchange Conf 
~--------------------------
An outsider uses a device to 
physically tap the communications 
line. 
The attacker discovers an 
unknown encryption key. 
An attacker discovers an unknown 
encryption key by choosing a set 
of plaintexts and causing the 
corresponding set of ciphertexts to 
be generated. 
A n attacker disco vers an 
encryption key by choosing 
samples of both plaintext and 
ciphertext, and causing them to be 
encrypted and decrypted, 
respectively, using a known 
algorithm and the unknown key. 
An attacker discovers the plaintext 
that corresponds to the given 
ciphertext, knowing only the 
encryption algorithm being used. 
The attacker has no plain-text 
examples to work from, nor does 
he/she know the encryption key 
that was used. 




















[Attack] 7,1 In our 
context, storage 
can be abused by 
flooding the 
printing queue with 
lot of large 
document. 
[Attack] 7,2, l 
[Attack] 7,2, 1 In 
our context 
remember that data 
communication 















------------,- ----- --------,---------------------· 
T.Hack _ Crypto.Hack _ Cry 
pto_plnTxt 
T.Hack _ Crypto.Hack _ Phys 
Cnf Eman 
An attacker discovers an 4 
encryption key by comparing 
corresponding plaintext and 
ciphertext samples. 
An attacker collects unintended 
system emanations, interprets 
them, and thus retrieves 
information that is being 







TJi;~k_M~~q.Hack_Masq ····-1A hacker captures the in-t-er-a-ct-iv_e __ !O.Audit G-en- U~;~ ----- '4jj __ l_n_o-ur Zc;nteJct __ _ 
[_HÙack 
----·-------
IT.Hack _ Masq.Hack _ Masq 
' Uwkstn 
------------
T.Hack _ Masq.Hack _ Masq 
Wauth 
T.Hack_Msg_ Data.Hack _ 
MsgData _ RcvTSF 
[T.Hack _ Msg_ Data. Hack _ 
MsgData _ Revu sr 
: T.Hack _ Msg_ Data.Hack _ 
MsgData _ SndTSF 
'T.Hack _ Msg_ Data.Hack _ 




session of an authorized user. The 
hacker now appears as a 
legitimate user and can perform 
any action allowed to that user, 
including reading or modifying 
sensitive data. 
An individual takes advantage of 
an unattended but active 
workstation to perform operations 
in the name of the logged-in user. 
Such operations may include 
some operations that the attacker 
is not normally allowed to 
perform. 
Services are provided to a user 
application without adequate 
authentication of the client 
requesting the service. This would 
permit someone to receive 
services for which they are not 
authorized. However, the server 
would see them as a legitimate 
user, which is why this is 
classified as a masquerade attack. 
Security-critical (TSF) data is 
modified in transit from a remote 
trusted site, either accidentally by 
the communications infrastructure 
or deliberately by a hostile 
outsider. 
A hostile outsider modifies 
message data in route to the 
system. Altematively, errors in the 
communications infrastructure 
modify the message. 
Security-critical (TSF) data is 
modified in transit to a remote 
site, either accidentally by the 
communications infrastructure or 
deliberately by a hostile outsider. 
O.Trusted Path 






O.User Auth Enhanced 
O.User Auth Multiple 
O.TSF Rcv Err ID Loc 
O.TSF Rcv Err ID Rem 
O.TSF Rcv Err Rcvr Lo 
f 
O.TSF Rcv Err Rcvr Re 
I!!. 
O.Rcv MsgMod ID 
O.Rcv MsgMod Rcvr 
O.TSF Snd Err ID Loc 
O.TSF Snd Err ID Rem 
O.TSF Snd Err Rcvr Lo 
f 
O.TSF Snd Err Rcvr Re 
I!!. 
,-. .,.,._ --- -r- ··---·---· -·---·-·· ·--·-· 
1A hostile outsider modifies 
1message data in route to a remote 
lsite. Altematively, errors in the 
!communications infrastructure 
,modify the message. 
11System emissions, typically 
electromagnetic radiation, disrupt 
:electronic circuits in nearby 
,equipment, causing them to fait or 
behave erratically. 
••••rn•-•••---,_.,.,_ 
,An attacker collects unintended 
O.Snt MsgMod ID 
O.Snt MsgMod Rcvr 
O.lnterferEman Control 
rO:EMSEC Design 
:the threat can be 




14,3,5,2 In our 
icontext the threat 
lcan be summarized 
as : let unauthorized 
users use printers. 
[Attack] 
14,3,5,2 ln our 
lcontext the threat 
/can be summarized 
' as: let unauthorized 
lusers use printers. 
i[Attack] 






'. phase that would 
:have impact on 
user printing 
:quotas. 
; 1,2 for instance: 
,modify the 
, feedback about 
document queue 
state, page printed, 
,document owner, . .. 
1,2 
1,2 for instance: 
modify the 
document that will 
be printed using the 
TOE. 
1,2 for instance: 
modify the 
document that will 
be printed using the 
TOE. 





iT.Hack _phys.Hack _phys _ 
jDamage 
! 
:T.Hack _ Social_ Engineer.H 
:ack _ SocEng_Password 
1 
system emanations, 
them, and thus 
information that is 




Physical attack causes damage to 
cryptographie functions and/or 
release of cryptographie assets 
Hacker physically attacks the 
system, causing physical damage 
and Joss of security protection. 
A hacker persuades a user or 
administrator to reveal his 
password, giving the hacker 








O.Limit Mult Sessions 




i r. ac 
iprinted by a given 
:use [Att k] 
14,7 [Attaok] 
7 One of the most 
easy application of 
this threat would be 
to eut printer's 
wire. [Attack] 
lThis threat cover 
1
"social engineered" 
type of attack. 
[Attack] 
----··--··-"'-----------,---------------r-----------~--------
I A hacker persuades a user or :This threat cover 
T.Hack_Social_Engineer.H 
ack _ SocEng_ Syslnfo 
IT.Malicious Code.Mal Co 
· de Hack o;wnld 
- -
T.Malicious Code.Mal Co 
ide_ Hack _ Exe 
T.Malicious Code.Mal Co 
ide IT Download 
T.Malicious Code.Mal Co - -
de IT Exe 
,T.Malicious Code.Mal Co - -
de Usr Downld 
O.Admin Guidance · 
administrator to reveal !"social engineered" 
O.Audit Unusual User 
information about 
operational procedures, 
and known flaws. 
syStem O.Identify Unusual Act itype of attack. 
auditing O.User Guidance j(Attack] 
A perpetrator disseminates 
malicious code via push or pull 
mechanism. 
A perpetrator executes malicious 
code either remotely or locally. 
An IT device accidentally 
transfers or downloads malicious 
code to itself or other device that 
it can influence. 
nder normal 
state required 
1An IT device u 
Joperations enters a 
to execute the matie ious code. 
1 
- r -
:An authorized user accidentally 
idownloads malicious code. 
O.Clean Obj Recovery 
O.Code Signing 





O.Admin Code Val 
O.Clean Obj Recovery 
O.Code Signing 
O.General lnteg Checks 





O.Clean Obj Recovery 
O.Code Signing 




O.Admin Code Val 
O.Clean Obj Recovery 
O.Code Signing 
O.General Integ Checks 
O.I&A User Action 
O.Isolate Executables 





'7. For instance: a 
\flaw in the OS on 
:which the TOE 
inlnS. 
1,7 This threat 
becomes more 
:important if the 
TOE applies 
modification on the 
printed documents 
,(that can the case in 
T.Malicious Code.Mal Co 
de Usr Exe 
T.Power _ Disrupt.Power _ D 
· isrupt_ Reset 
T.Repudiate _ Receive.Repu 
diate Rcvr Int 
T.Repudiate_Receive.Repu 
diate Rcvr Local 
T.Repudiate _ Receive.Repu 
diate Rcvr Rem 
T.Repudiate _ Send.Repudia 
te Send 
An authorized user executes 
malicious code accidentally. 
··1··-···· --
An unintentional, malicious, or 
environmentally caused power 
reset occurs, resulting in the Joss 
of critical information or the 
system to enter a non-secure state. 
A local, authorized user receives a 
message from another local user 
via the system, and then denies 
having received it. This typically 
affects the sender of the message 
who is counting on 
responsibilities associated with 
receipt of the message. 
1············· 
! 
IA local, authorized user receives a 
message from another user at a 
remote trusted product, and then 
denies having received it. 
iA local, authorized user sends a 
!message to another user at a ,remote trusted product who then 
ldenies having received it. 
1A local, authorized user sends a 
jmessage to another local user via 
the system, and then denies 
O.Admin Code Val 
O.Clean Obj Recovery 
O.Code Signing 
O.General Integ Checks 




O.NonRepud Locals Rcv 
Q 
r 
O.NonRepud Assess Rec 
Q 
O.NonRepud Gen Recd 
O.NonRepud Assess Rec 
Q 
O.NonRepud Gen Recd 
,O.NonRepud Locals Sen 
11 
'.~ur 3 usage model). 
iRemember that 
.document are sent 





1,7 This threat is 
the logic sequel to 
T.Malicious Code. 
Mal Code U sr Do - - -
wnld (see above). 
In our context 
executing the code 
can be done by 
actually printing 
the document. 









possible to perform 
some malicious 
action using this 
.programming 
ilanguage. 
•7,2 For instance: 
!blackout during 
\printing. 
12 for instance: an 
iadministrator 
linforms the user 
that the next 
printed copies will 
1have an additional 
cost. 
· 1,2 ln our context, 
most of the 
feedback 
: information are 
!coming from the 
· printer (print state, 
paper format 
allowed, ... ), the 
printer represent 
the remote user. 




1,2 for instance: an 
user orders 200 
copies of the same 
' 
! 
having done it. This affects the 
recipient of the message as well as 
any resources allocated or 
modified by the recipient in 
response to the message. 
!document 
id . . eny 1t. 
then 
---.---------------.---------------------1 






'. T.Spoofing.Hack Spoof 
IMsgHdr - -
! 
IT.User Abuse Conf.User - - -
Abuse Conf Disk 
T User Abuse Conf.User - -
Abuse_ Conf_ Steg 
.T.User Collect.User Colle 
ict_Bro~se 
T.User Collect.User Colle - -
et Deceive 
T.User Collect.User Colle - -
et Deduce 
An authorized user participates in 
a transaction by responding to 
system/application prompts and 
then denies that the dialogue took 
place. The user and 
system/application are collocated. 
An attacker simulates the system's 
login program and runs it at an 
open terminal or workstation in 
order to capture a legitimate user's 
authentication data. 
An attacker may modify protocol 
headers such that a user believes 
the communication is coming 
from a source that is different 
from where it was actually sent. 
A user collects sensitive or 
proprietary infonnation and 
improperly removes it from the 
system by putting it on removable 
media. 
An authorized user hides sensitive 
information in an innocuous-
appearing file, for the purpose of 
covertly passing it to an 
unauthonzed party. The h1dden 
data is undetectable to anyone 
using the file for its intended 
purpose, but can be recovered 
using special techniques. 
An authorized user abuses granted 
authorizations by browsing files in 
order to collect data. 
An authorized user steals 
authentication data by emulating a 
login procedure on an active 
,terminal. 
!An authorized user abuses granted 
1authorizations by repeatedly 
l
accessing aggregate data in order 
to deduce specific, sensitive data. 
- -!An authorized user abuses granted 
T.User Collect.User Colle 
et Eaves - 1authorizations by eavesdropping 
on communication lines in order 
O.l&A Transaction 
O.NonRepud Locals Rcv 
Q 
O.NonRepud Locals Sen 
! 
O.Trusted Path 
O.User Auth Enhanced 
r- ·-·••-'- - . ·-· - -- --·-· -
O.Comm Trusted Chann 
tl 
O.C!ypto Comm Channe 
l 




O.Data Export Control 
O.Admin Code Val 
O.Admm Code Val Sten 
O.Export Control 
O.Standard Oumut Pres 
O.Audit Account 
O.Info Flow Control 




O.lnfo Flow Control 
O.User Defined AC 
O.Data Exchange Conf 
O.Integ User Data !nt 
O.Security Roles 
1,2 for instance: an 
user prints 200 
copies of the same 
document then 
deny it. 







3 for instance: 
limporting data or 
!document from a 
printing queue and 
exporting them to 
removable media 
- "" -,----------1 ! 1 for instance: an 
1user hide sensitive 













, be retrieved from 
printing queue 
(Who print the 
most? When? Etc.) 
-- ----
1,2 
T.User _ Collect.User _ Colle 
'et Residue 
'T.User _Err_ Conf.Hack _ Ex 
Jt_ CryptoAsset 
;T.User_Err _ Conf.User _Err 
Conf Class 
T.User Err Conf.User Err - - -
_ Conf_ Crypto 
T.User Err Conf.User Err - - -
:_Conf_Exp 
:T.User _ Err _lnaccess. User_ 
!Err Delete 
----------
T.User Err Inaccess.User 
. - - -
,Err_Mod_Attr 
T.User Err lnaccess.User 
- - -
Err Set Attr 
An authorized user collects 
residual data from public objects 
after prior usage. 
Cryptographie assets are 
mishandled after they leave the 
TOE, either in transit or while 
residing on stored media . 
.. ---·----· -----·-
An authorized user presents 
confidential or classified 
information to a rec1p1ent, 
indicating that it is Jess sensitive 
than it really is, thereby 
encouraging the recipient to pass 
it along to other potentially 
inappropriate recipients. 
User error causes release of 
cryptographie assets to 
unauthorized recipients. 
An authorized user exposes or 
exports data in violation of export 
control policy. The data may be 
private or classified, the recipient 
is not authorized to receive it. 
An authorized user accidentally 
deletes user data. 
An authorized user erroneously 
modifies the initial security 
attributes of user data, which 
makes the data inaccessible. 
r-, 
! 
;An authorized user erroneously 
sets the initial security attributes 
of user data, which makes the data 
inaccessible. 
- '!Cryptographie ass;t;--- a~e 
T.User_Err_lntegrity.Hack mishandled after the leave the 
_ Ext_ CryptoAsset 1TOE, either in transit or while 




IAn authorized user presents incorrect information, indicating 
O.No Residual Info 
,------------
O.Crypto Import Export 
O.Crypto Manage Roles 
O.AC Label Export 
O.Crypto AC 
O.Crypto Key Man 
O.I&A Domain 
O.l&A User Action 
O.User Conf Prevention 
O.Rollback 
O.User Guidance 
O.Security Attr Mgt 
O.User Guidance 
O.Security Attr Mgt 
O.User Guidance 
O.Crypto Import Export 
O.Crypto Manage Roles 
1O.AC Label Export 
our context, 
!attention is needed 
,on the fact that 
ifesidual info of the 
iprocess can be 
printed document. 
lt can be the whole 
document or only 
the header page of 
the printer. 
i 4 
; 1,3 for instance: 






13, This threat is a 
lgeneric threat for 
[every system using 
1 authentification. 
!"expose" can be 
idone by printing a 
idocument. 
3 for instance: a 
:user deletes the 
'wrong document in 
the printing queue. 
13 for instance: a 
;user modifies 
ldocument 
lproperties in such a 
:way that it can't be 
;printed anymore. 
;3, for instance a 
:user set a document 
'to be printed using 
wrong paper format 
,causing the 
document to stay 







to the recipient that it is correct, 
thereby encouraging the recipient 
to make unwarranted use of the 
information. 
,...... ----- ---- - ---..--------------
T.User_Err_Integrity.User 
_Modify_Data 
T.User Err Slf Protect.Us - - -
:er _Err_ MsngAttr Xpt 
T.User Err Slf Protect.Us - -
1
er_Err_Object_Attr 
An authorized user modifies or 
deletes user data in violation of 
organizational policy. 
An authorized user deliberately or 
accidentally exports data so that 
the data is not accompanied by 
required handling information. 
An authorized user sets an object's 
security attributes inappropriately, 
misdirecting its use. The 
misdirection may allow 
unauthorized reading or 
modification, or it may prohibit 
authorized reading or 
modification. 
-- ---- - ... -·· ..-------------
T.User Misuse Avl Resc. - -
1user _ Comm _ Overload 
T.User Misuse Avl Resc. - - -
,User ErrAvl AudExhst - -
T.User Misuse Avl Resc. - - -
User Obst Res Use - - -
T.User Misuse Avl Resc. - - -
User Prcsr Overload 
T.User Misuse Avl Resc. - -
User_ Stg_ Overload 
An authorized user exceeds the 
authorized use of communication 
resources during the system 
(TOE) operation. This causes a 
denial or delay in service to 
legitimate operations within the 
TOE scope of control. 
An authorized user's actions 
generate so many audit records 
that audit storage space 1s 
exhausted and the system 
subsequently denies further 




An authorized user obstructs the 
use resources by unauthorized 
modification of data file, 
communication channel, or object 
security attributes. 
The system (TOE) has been over-
tasked and can not complete the 
assigned tasking at ail or in an 
expected amount of time. The user 
linvokes processing functions in 
association with unauthorized 
activity that leads to 
overburdening processing 
,resources on the TOE. 
--r - -- -· - -· 
An authorized user's unauthorized 
use of data storage causes a 
1
shortage of disk space for other 
jusers. 
O.Audit Generation 
O.Info Flow Control 
O.User Defmed AC 
,------------
O.AC Label Export 
O.AC Label Export 
O.Obj Attr Integrity 
O.Audit Generation 
O.Data Imp Exp Control 
O.Limit Comm Sessions 
O.Priority Of Service 
O.Resource Quotas 
O.Audit Loss Respond 
O.Guarantee Audit Stg 
O.Manage TSF Data 
O.Manage Res Sec Attr 




O.Limit Comm Sessions 





O.Limit Comm Sessions 
,O.Priority Of Service 
!O.Resource Quotas 
1 
'document in an 
incompatible 
format. 
.4,3 for instance 
1modifying print 
!queue state. 
. 1,3 for instance 
sending document 
to the outputware 
without using the 
,adequate software. 
, 1,3 for instance a 
iuser print the 
,document with 
wrong privacy 
ioption, therefore it 
1get printed on the 
1wrong printer. 
1,3 for instance: a 
user sending the 
same large 
!document man y 
ltimes. 
1,3,6 
1,3 for instance: a 
user flooding the 
network with 
unuseful data in a 
. way that prevent 
TOE to 
!communicate with 
the other part of the 
network. 
1,3 this problem 
can occur if too 
many users are 
trying to print 
documents at the 
same time. 
1,2,3 for instance: a 
user that use space 
on the TOE' s host 


















IT.User Send.User Send C - -
!onf 















An authorized user modifies audit 
data or audit attributes to avoid 
accountability. 
An authorized user changes the 
authentication data of another user 
without first masquerading as that 
user in a manner that is not , 
consistent with organizational 
security policy. 
An authorized user modifies or 
deletes user data in violation of 
organizational policy. 
User modifies or deletes TSF data 
undermining security protection. 
An authorized user hides sensitive 
information in an innocuous-
appearing file, for the purpose of 
covertly passing it to an 
unauthorized party. The hidden 
data is undetectable to anyone 
using the file for its intended 
1purpose, but can be recovered 
lusing special techniques. 
An authorized user abuses granted 
authorizations and violates export 
control policy by sending data to a 
recipient who is not authorized to 
receive the data. 
An authorized user de\iberately 
exports data inappropriately, with 
the result that there is a Jack of 
required quality control on the 
exported data. 






0 Securitv Data Mgt 
O.Audit Generation 
O.lnfo Flow Control 




O.General lnteg Checks 
O.Info Flow Control 
O.Jnteg Sys Data Int 
O.Integri.ty Practice 
O.Maintain Sec Domain 
O.Reference Monitor 
O.User Defined AC 
O.Adrnin Code Val 
O.Adrnin Code Val Sten 
O.Exgort Control 
O.Standard Ou!J2ut Pres 
O.Audit Generation 
O.lnteg Data Mark Exg 
O.Audit Generation 
O.lnteg Data Mark Exg 
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1,3, for instance: a 
user try to modify 
his printing quota 
,in order to be able 
! to print more page . 
1, 3 
1,3 
1,3 this threat can 
be seen if the user 
is hostile, therefore 
it's considered as 
an attack [ Attack] 
1,3 this threat can 
be seen if the user 
is hostile, therefore 
it's considered as 
an attack [Attack] 
1,3 this threat can 
be seen if the user 
is hostile, therefore 
:it's considered as 
!an attack [Attack] 
: 1,3 this threat can 
be seen if the user 
is hostile, therefore 
it's considered as 
an attack [Attack] 
!Description 
;D . . . l JSCUSSlOll 
Provide mechanisms to assure that changes to 
security related data are executed only by authorized 
'personnel. 
The system shall provide individual accountability 
for auditable actions. 
·············;············· ...... , ...................... . 
Depending of the presence 
of an operator, this policy 
will impact 2 or 3 kinds of 
·users : classic users, 
.administrators and 
operator. 
'ln our context auditable 
actions are ail kind of 

























;The system shall provide the capability to ensure that 
ail audit records include enough information to 
determine the date and time of action, the system 
locale of the action, the system entity that initiated or 
completed the action, the resources involved, and the 
action involved. 
The system shall protect the contents of the audit 
trails against unauthorized access, modification, or 
deletion. 
Notification of threats and vulnerabilities shall be 
addressed. 
···---· ... ••····•··- ...................... ·-·-···-···· ............. ,_., ________ 
Notify user of the time and date of the last 
modification of data. 
A configuration management plan shall be 
implemented by the system. The system shall 
implement configuration management to assure 
storage integrity, identification of system 
connectivity (software, hardware, and firmware), and 
!identification of system components (software, 
!hardware, and firmware) . The system shall 
1, 1 strong integrity mechanisms (integrity /tmP ement 
/locks, encryption). 
The system shall provide procedures and features to 
assure that system recovery is done in a trusted and 
secure manner. Any crrcumstances that could result 




The system shall provide security parameters 
associated with information exchanged between 
systems. 
P.User The system shall provide Identification and 
identification and authentication (I&A) procedures which uniquely 
authentication identify and authenticate users. 
,----------
P. S tr on g integrity iThe system shall implement strong integrity 
mechanisms jmechanisms (integrity locks, encryption). 
~--------
P.Operational !Provide system functional tests to periodically test 
integrity system ithe integrity of the hardware and code running 









[Security shall be addressed throughout the system's 
\lifecycle. 




'Procedures and mechanisms to prevent the 
!introduction of malicious code into the system shall 
!be provided. 
information (user login, 
... ). 
....... ,.,--·•········ .... ···-------
This IS a generic policy 
that needs to be 
instantiated to say which 
data needs notification. 




The system shall function so that each user has 
;access to ail of the information and functions that the 
!user requires to perform duties, but no more. 
!~P-.N- on- -r-ep_u_d_i-at-io_n __ :The system shall provide non-repudiation 
-----



























!Documentation shall include guides or manuals for 
!the system's privileged users. 
iThe system shall provide a screen Iock mechanism. 
' 
The system shall provide assurance that storage 
integrity is effective. 
The system shall notify users prior to gaining access 
that the user's actions may be monitored and 
recorded, that using the system consents to such 
monitoring, and that unauthorized use may result in 
criminal or civil penalties. 
Fe a tu r es and procedures to validate the integrity and 
the expected operation of the security-relevant 
software, hardware, and firrnware shall be provided 
by the system . 
Pro vide the capability to restore the system to a 
secure state after discontinuities of system 
operations. 
The system shall provide backup procedures to allow 
restoration of the system with minimal Joss of service 
or data. 
!The system shall provide procedures to ensure both 
!the existence of sufficient backup storage capability 
land effective restoration (incremental and complete) 
1ofthe backup data. 
P.Backup '. The system shall provide appropriate physical and 
protection and !technical protection of the backup and restoration 
restoration (hardware, firmware, and software . 
...---------
P. Protection from iProvide features or procedures for protection of the 








!Provide procedures and features to assure that system 
!recovery is done in a trusted and secure manner. 
!The system shall detect physical tampering and 
inotify the appropriate authority. 
! 
i 
!repudiation mechanism is 
:an implementation of 
ldigital signatures. 
...-------------------------------·-- ---·-·- ---------












!authentication for privileged users who either reside 
;outside of the system's perimeter or whose 
!communications traverse data lines outside of the 
system's perimeter . 
. · ---·-- ---
The system shall provide data transmission using an 
encryption mechanism appropriate for the sensitivity 
of the data. 
!The system shall provide appropriate storage, 
lcontinuous personnel access control storage, or 
'encrypted storage of data based on the sensitivity of 
the data. 
The system shall provide a protected distribution 
l







iThe system shall provide a Discretionary Access 
·control (DAC) function (i.e. , a user can grant access 
jauthorization to other users for data they control). 








Design administrative functions in such a way 
that administrators do not automatically have 
access to user objects, except for necessary 
exceptions. For an accounts administrator, the 
necessary exceptions include allocation and de-
allocation of storage. For an audit administrator, 
the necessary exceptions include observation of 
audited actions. ln general, the exceptions tend 
to be role specific. 
Provide object security attributes in exported 
data with moderate to high effectiveness. The 
attributes are those associated with specific 
security function policies. 
Display information related to the most recent 
successful and unsuccessful attempts to establish 
a user session, once a user successfully 
establishes a user session. 
Limit the administrator from modification of 
user-subject bindings in an effort to deter users 
acting without accountability. 
iT.Admin _Hostile_ Modify.Adm _ 
iHstl_Mod_Data_AC 
iT.Admin _Hostile_ Modify.Adm _ 
:Hstl_ Mod _ DataAps 
T.Admin_Hostile_Modify.Adm_ 
:Hstl Mod SEP 
!T. User_ Err_ Slf _Protect.User _ Er 
ir MsngAttrXpt 
iT. User_ Err _lntegrity.User _Err_ 
'AttrXpt 
T.User Err Conf.User Err Con - - - -
f Class 
T.User Err Slf Protect.User Er - - - -
r _ Object_ Attr 
T.User Collect.User Collect De - - -
!ceive 
JT.Admin _Hostile_ Modify.Adm _ 





Deter the administrator from maliciously 
modifying users' attributes. Such modifications 
could allow unauthorized user actions or denial 
of service to a legitimate user. 
1 Validate executable objects prior to allowing 
execution. Validation needs to be done by 
someone with an expertise to recognize 
malicious code and the authority and means to 




Validate exported objects for absence of 
steganographic content prior to allowing 
exportation. Validation needs to be done by 
someone with an expertise to recognize hidden 
content and the authority and means to prevent 
its export . 
.,_, .... ••····· 
;T.Admin _Hostile_ Modify .Adm _ 
IHstl Mod UsrAttr 
T.User Send.User Abuse Conf 
- - -
i_Steg 
T.Malicious Code.Mal Code U - - -
'sr Exe 
T.User Abuse Conf.User Abus - - -
,e _ Conf_ Steg 
!T.Malicious Code.Mal Code I - -
T Exe 
T.Malicious Code.Mal Code H - - -
ack Exe 
T.User Abuse Conf.User Abus - -
e _Conf_ Steg 





0 .Aud_ Sys _ Entry _parms 
O.Audit Account 
jo.Audit_Admin_ Role 
Deter administrator errors by providing adequate 
administrator guidance. 
~------------------
Apply patches to fix the code when 
vulnerabilities in code allow unauthorized and 
undiscovered access. 
Recover automatically to a consistent, secure 
state if a security function does not complete 
successfully in the presence of certain types of 
failures . 
Deter an administrator from changing system 
entry parameters to allow an unauthorized user 
access to organizational assets to which they are 
forbidden . 
Provide information about past user behavior to 
an authorized user through system mechanisms. 
Specifically, during any specified time interval, 
the system is able to report to a user acting in an 
identified audit role selected auditable actions 
that a user has performed, and as a result, what 
auditable objects were affected and what 
auditable information was received by that user. 
Deter modification or destruction of audit data 
through the creation of an audit-administration 
role. 
[T:A~~ _ Err Commit.Ad.min E 
;rr Authentic 
T.User Abuse Conf.User Abus - - -
,e Conf Disk 
JT.Admin _Err_ Comm it.Admin _ E 
; rr _ Resource 
T.Admin Err Commit.Ad.min E - - -
rr User Attr 
T.Admin Err Commit.Ad.min E - - -
rr_AC_Policy 
T.Admin Err Commit.Ad.min E 
rr Audit 
T.Admin Err Omit.Ad.min Err 
- - - -
Update 
IT.Hack _ Social_ Engineer.Hack _ 
1SocEng_Syslnfo 
T.Admin Err Commit.Ad.min E - - -
,rr_Info 
'T.Admin Err Commit.Admin E - - -
rr _ Sys _Entry 
1 T. Ha c k AC.Hack AC Code V - - - -
iul 
:T.Power _ Disrupt.Power _Disrupt 
· Reset 
T.Admin _Hostile_ Modify .Adm _ 
Hstl Mod SEP 
T.User_Modify.User_Modify_A 
uth 
T.Admin Err Omit.Admin Err - - - -
,Update 
1T.User Collect.User Collect Br - - -
owse 
T.User Abuse Conf.User Abus - - -
e Conf Disk 
T.Admin Err Commit.Adm Err - - -
_Crypto 
T.Admin Err Omit.Adm Err C - - - -
rypto 
T.Admin _Hostile_ Modify .Adm _ 
Hstl Mod Data AC 
- - -
T.Dev Flawed Code.Dev FC T - - - -
rap_Door 
T.Admin _ Hostile _Modify.Adm _ 
Hstl_ Mod _ DataAps 
T.Admin _Hostile_ Modify .Adm _ 
Hstl Mod SEP 
T.Admin Err Commit.Admin E - - -
rr Audit 
T.Dev Flawed Code.Dev FC T - - - -
rap_Door 
T.Admin_Hostile_Modify.Adm_ 
Hstl Audit Dstr - -
T.Admin_Hostile_Modify.Adm_ 
, ·- -
1 r ····~······ 'Hstl Mod IFC 
f
----------- .-A-u-d-it- sy-s-te_m_ a_c_ce_s_s_t_o_d_i_sc_o_v_er- sy- s-te_m_ m- is-u-se--T.Hack AC.Hack AC Code v 
O.Audit_Deter_Misuse and provide a potential deterrent by warning the - - - -
ul 
user. 
O.Audit Gen User 
O.Audit Generation 
O.Audit_ Loss _ Respond 
jo .Audit_Protect 
IO.Audit_ Unusual_ User 
f 
lo.Change_ Control_ Users 
Provide individual accountability for audited 
events. Uniquely identify each user so that 
auditable actions can be traced to a user. 
Record in audit records: date and time of action, 
location of the action, and the entity responsible 
for the action. 
Respond to possible Joss of audit records when 
audit trail storage is full or nearly full. 
Protect audit records against unauthorized 
access, modification, or deletion to ensure 
accountability of user actions. 
jAudit unusual user activity. 
[
Notify users of changes to data content in order 







IT.User Misuse Avl Resc.User 












:T. User_ Err _lntegrity.User _ Modi 
,fy_Data 
IT. User_ Send. User_ Send _ Conf 
T. User_ Send. User_ Send _ lntegrit 
y 




T.Hack Av! Resource.Hack Pr - - -
csr Overload 
T.Hack Avl Resource.Hack St - - -
g_Overload 
T.Hack Avl Resource.Hack Co - -
mm Overload 
,. 
,T.Admin _Err_ Commit.Admin _ E 
:rr Audit 
T.Admin _ Hostile _Modify.Adm _ 
Hstl Mod Data AC - - -
T.User_Misuse_Avl_Resc.User_ 
ErrAvl AudExhst 
T.Admin _Hostile_ Modify.Adm _ 
Hstl Audit Dstr - -
T.Admin _ Hostile _Modify.Adm _ 




Hstl Mod IFC 
T.Admin Err Commit.Ad.min E - - -
rr Audit 
T.Hack _ Social_ Engineer.Hack _ 
SocEng_ Syslnfo 
O.Clean _ Obj_ Recovery 
O.Code _ Signing 
.Comm Line Protection 




10 .C,ypto _AC 
----
O.Crypto _ Comm _ Channel 
1O.Crypto_Data_Sep 
1 
Recover to a viable state after malicious code is 
introduced and damage occurs, removing the 
malicious code as part of the process. 
Check verification of signed downloaded code 
prior to execution. A well-known example is 
checking digital signatures on signed Java 
applets. 
~------------------
Protect communications lines from physical 
tampering. 
Provide a communications channel between the 
system and a remote trusted system for the 
performance of security-critical operations. 
1 m pl e ment a configuration management plan. 
Implement configuration management to assure 
storage integrity, identification of system 
connectivity (software, hardware, and firmware), 
and identification of system components 
(software, hardware, and firmware). 
1Provide the ability for the authorized user to 
1verify that the system operates as designed. 
Restrict user access to cryptographie IT assets in 
accordance with a specified user access control 
policy. 
Provide secure session establishment between 
the system and remote systems using encryption 
functions . 
Provide complete separation between plaintext 
and encrypted data and between data and keys. 
This requires separate channels and separate 
storage areas. The only place any data can pass 
between the plaintext and encrypted data 
modules is in the cryptographie engine. There 
should be no way for plaintext keys to reach 
either data module and no way for data to enter 
the key handling module. Eencrypted keys can 
be handled as encrypted data, but with limited 
user access. 
T.Malicious Code.Mal Code I - - -
T Download 
T.Malicious Code.Mal Code H - - -
;ack Downld 
T.Malicious Code.Mal Code U - - -
sr Exe 
T.Malicious Code.Mal Code I - - -
T Exe 
T.Malicious Code.Mal Code U - -
sr Downld 
T.Malicious _Code.Mal_ Code _H 
ack Exe 
!T.Malicious_ Code.Mal_ Code_l 
iT _ Download 
\T.Malicious Code.Mal Code U - - -
lsr_Downld 
'T.Malicious Code.Mal Code H - - -
;ack Exe 
iT.Malicious _ Code.Mal_ Code_ H 
:ack Downld 
T.Dev Flawed Code.Dev FC T - - - -
:rap_Door 
T .Malicious _ Code.Mal_ Code_ U 
!sr_Exe 
:T.Malicious _ Code.Mal_ Code _I 
!T_Exe 
l T. Ha c k _ Comm _ Eavesdrop.Hack 
i_ CommEaves _ Tap 




T.Dev Flawed Code.Dev FC S - - - -
,elf_Protect 
T.User Err Conf.User Err Con - - - -
f_Crypto 
T.Spoofing.Hack _ Spoof_ MsgHd 
'r 





[- -·- ___ .. __ ,, ---·-
,O.Crypto _ Extem _ Depend 
0 .Crypto _ Import_ Export 
O.Crypto_Key_Man 
O.Crypto _Manage_ Roi es 
O.Crypto _Modular _ Dsgn 
Minimize or even eliminate design and 
implementation errors in the cryptographie 
modules and functions. 
Specify security functional requirements (SFRs) 
that are expected to be satisfied by other 
software, firmware or hardware that is extemal 
to the TOE. 
Protect cryptographie data assets when they are 
being transmitted to and from the TOE, either 
through intervening untrusted components or 
directly to/from human users. 
~------------------
Fully define cryptographie components, 
functions , and interfaces. Ensure appropriate 
protection for cryptographie keys throughout 
their lifecycle, covering generation, distribution, 
storage, use, and destruction. 
-------------
Provide one or more roles to manage 
cryptographie assets and attributes. 
Prevent errors in one part of the TOE from 
influencing other parts, especially cryptographie 
parts. To this end, noncryptographic 1/0 paths 
must be well defined and logically independent 
of circuitry and processes performing key 
generation, manual key entry, key zeroising, and 
similar key-related operations. 
JT.Component_Failure.TSF _Err_ 
jConf_ Crypto 
!T.Dev _Flawed _ Code.Ext_ Crypt 
io_Failure 
T. User_ Err_ Integrity.Rack _ Ext_ 
CryptoAsset 
T. User _Err_ Conf.Rack_ Ext_ Cry 
iptoAsset 
T. A dm in Err Omit.Adm Err C 
- - - -
rypto 
T. User Err Conf.User Err Con 
- - - -
J_Crypto 
iT.Component_Failure. TSF_ Err_ 
!Conf_Crypto 
/T .Admin _Err_ Commit.A dm_ Err 
:_Crypto 
T. A dm in_ Err_ Omit.Adm _Err_ C 
lrypto 
:T.Admin Err Commit.Adm Err - - -
_Crypto 







~ :Crypto _ Operation - Cryptographie components, functions, and T.Component_Failure.TSF _Err_ 
interfaces shall be fully defined. Conf_ Crypto 
l'
O.Crypto _ Self_ Test ... ... - - !Provide the ability to verify that the -T-.C- o_m_ p-on_e_n_t_-F-a-il-u-re-.-T-S-F _ E_rr __ _ , 
jcryptographic functions operate as designed. Conf_ Crypto 
1 ---r----------------------------------
1O.Crypto _ Test_ Reqs 
io .Data_ Ex change_ Conf 
1 
10. Data_ Export_ Control 
1 
O.Data _lmp _Exp_ Control 
Test cryptographie operation and key T.Component_Failure.TSF _Err_ 
management. !Conf_ Crypto 
- --------------! 
Protect user data confidentiality 
exchanging data with a remote system. 
when 
T.User Collect.User Collect Ea 
- - -
ves 
T.Rack _ Comm _ Eavesdrop.Rack 
CommEaves Intrc 
T.Rack _ Comm _ Eavesdrop.Hack 
CommEaves Eman -········ .............................. - ......... - ... . .................. - .. ·······--- ·-···-..................... - ····--·· .. ··• ... · ..•. ,-·· -·-·-· ---- .......... ,, ............ . .. -
Impose information control policies that do not 
allow export of specified data and/or export to 
specified locations. 
Protect data from being sent to erroneous places 
and more places externat to the system than 
allowed by the organization's security policy. 
Conversely the import of data into the system 
1should be protected from illicit infonnation or 
!information not allowed by the organization's 
lsecurity policy. 
-----
T.User Abuse Conf.User Abus - - -
e Conf Disk 
T.User Misuse Avl Resc.User - -
Comm Overload 
T.Hack A vl Resource.Hack Co - - -
mm Overload 
1 
io .EMSEC _ Design 
1 1-
O.Encryption _ Access 
Design and build the system in such a way as to 
control the production of intelligible emanations 
within specified limits. 
Deter cryptoanalysis of ciphertext by denying 









jo .Guarantee _ Audit_ Stg 
16 :Ha~k Limit Sessions · - -
Prohibit the transmission of a ciphertext message 
over any network where the corresponding 
plaintext might be available. Include 
cryptographie padding (i.e., random plaintext) to 
hide the correspondence between segments of 
real ciphertext and their known plaintexts. 
Sanitize data objects that may contain hidden 
data when they are exported from the TOE in 
order to inhibit steganographic smuggling. 
Label or mark information for externat systems 
to prevent the exchange of inappropriate data 
between systems. 
Preserve the secure state of the system in the 
event of a secure component failure. 
Provide fault tolerant operations for critical 
components and continue to operate in the 
presence of specific failures in one or more 
system components. 
Provide periodic integrity checks on both system 
and user data. 
Maintain audit data and guarantee space for that 
data. 
!Limit the n~~ber of sessions available to outside 
T.Hack _ Phys.Hack _phys _ Cnf _ E 
:man 
iT.Hack _ Crypto.Hack _Phys _ Cnf 
Eman 
T.Hack _ Crypto.Hack _ Crypto _ C 
hsnCy 
T.Hack _ Crypto.Hack _ Crypto _ C 
ypher 
T .Hack _ Crypto.Hack _ Crypto _ C 
hsnTxt 
!T.Hack _ Crypto.Hack _ Crypto _ C 
ihsnPln 
1T.Hack _ Crypto.Hack _ Crypto _Pl 
inTxt 
!T.Hack _ Crypto.Hack _ Crypto _ C 
lhsnTxt 
T.Hack _ Crypto.Hack _ Crypto _ C 
thsnCy 
!T.Hack _ Crypto.Hack _ Crypto _ C 
·hsnPln 
T.User Abuse Conf.User Abus 
- - -
e _Conf_ Steg 















T.Malicious Code.Mal Code U - - -
sr Exe 




T.Malicious Code.Mal Code H - - -
ack Downld 
T.Malicious Code.Mal Code I - - -
T Download 
T.Malicious Code.Mal Code H - - -
ack Exe 
T.Hack Avl Resource.Hack St 
g_Overload 
T.User Misuse Avl Resc.User - - - -
ErrAvl AudExhst 
T.Hack Avl Resource.Hack St - - -
O.Hack Traffic Control - -
lo.1&A Domain 
1 -
---····· ···-···· .. ···------
users. A hacker can initiate multiple 
communication sessions that could cause an 
overload on resources, for example, half open 
session starts as is seen in "SYN flood" attacks. 
--------------
Control (e.g. reroute or discard) hacker 
communication traffic to prevent potential 
damage 
Provide the basic I&A functions that will 




O.I&A User Action 
10.Identify _ Unusual_ Act 
r 
lo.1nfo Flow Control 
Jü.Info _Flow_ Ctrl_ Admin 
Associate each transaction between a user and a 
system/application with a unique transaction ID, 
allowing events associated with a given 
transaction to be distinguished from other events 
involving the user and/or system/application. 
Uniquely identify and authenticate each user of 
the system. 
Associate each user-requested action with the 
user who requested the action. 
-----------------
unusual user activity on the system. 
Enforce an information flow policy whereby 
users are constrained from allowing access to 
information they control, regardless of their 
intent ( e.g., mandatory access control). This 
lattice property of security attributes is 
commonly associated with the U.S. DoD 
implementations of Mandatory Access Control 
(MAC). 
., Man~ge i~formatio~ flow control poÏicy and 
functions to allow only specified administrators 
g_Overload 
T.Hack Av! Resource.Hack Pr 
csr Overload 
, T.Hack_ Av!_ Resource.Hack _ Co 
'mm Overload 
IT.Hack_AC.Hack_AC_ Weak 
i T. Ha c k _Av 1 _ Resource.Hack _pr 
'csr Overload 
T.Hack Av! Resource.Hack St - - -
g_Overload 
T.Hack Avl Resource.Hack Co -
mm Overload 
!T. User_ Err_ Conf. User_ Err_ Con 
lf_Crypto 
T.Repudiate _ Transact.Repudiate 
!_Trans 
.T.Admin Hostile Modify.Adm 
iHstl_Mod_IFC - -
:T.Admin Err Commit.Admin E - - -
'rr Audit 
T.Dev Flawed Code.Dev FC T - - - -
rap_Door 
T.Admin _Hostile_ Modify.Adm _ 
Hstl Mod SEP 
T.Admin _Hostile_ Modify .Adm _ 
Hstl_Mod_DataAps 
T.Admin _Hostile_ Modify.Adm _ 
lHstl Audit Dstr - -
T. User_ Err_ Conf.User_ Err_ Con 
f_Crypto 
T.Admin Err Omit.Adm Err C 
!rypto - - - -
T.Malicious Code.Mal Code H 
- - -
lack_Exe 
iT.Malicious _ Code.Mal_ Code_ U 
,sr Exe 
!T.Malicious _ Code.Mal_ Code_! 
T Exe 
lT :-Admin Err Commit.Adm Err - - -
_Crypto 
T. Ha c k _ Social_ Engineer.Hack _ 
SocEng_ Syslnfo 








T.User Collect.User Collect Br 
owse - - -
T.Admin _Hostile_ Modify .Adm _ -
Hstl Mod IFC 
fy_Data J 
------------
0 .1 nput_ Inspection 
O.lnteg_Data_Mark_Exp 
lto have the ~bility to ma~ipulate the informati;~ flow control. 
Require inspection of downloads/transfers. 
Ensure that data markings are included with data 
that is exported to another trusted product. 
T.Malicious Code.Mal Code H - - -
,ack Downld 
T.Malicious Code.Mal Code I - -
T Download 
T.Malicious Code.Mal Code U - -
,sr Downld 
T.User Send.User Send Conf 
1T. User= Send. User= Send = Integrit 
y 
--- ------ -------~-------------------~-------------1 
O.Integ_Sys_Data_ Ext 
10.lnte~ Sys_Data_lnt - ----
,.0.Integ_ User _Data _!nt 
r-------
lo.1ntegrity_Attr _ Exch 
1 
1 








Ensure the integrity of system data exchanged 
extemally with another trusted product by using 
a protocol for data transfer that will permit error 
detection and correction. This includes detecting 
and possibly correcting errors in data received 
and encoding outgoing data to make it possible 
for the receiver to detect and possibly correct 
errors. The method for detecting and correcting 
errors is based on some method (protocol) that is 
agreed upon by participating parties. 
Ensure the integrity of system data transferred 
intemally. 
I
E~sur~ the ~t~grity of user data transferred 
intemally within the system. 




T.Dev Flawed Code.Dev FC - - - -
'Ctrl Data 
T.User Collect.User Collect Ea - - -
ves 
Attr_Interp 
security-attribute information with another 
f 
------T -.D-e-v F-la_w_e_d -Co_d_e_.D_e_v_F_C_ 
Ensure that the system correctly exchanges - - - -
trusted IT product. T.Spoofing.Hack _ Spoof_MsgHd 
r 
Provide integrity protection for user data and 
software. 
Ensure that when system data replication occurs 
across the system the data is consistent for each 
replication. 
Provide system functional tests to periodically 
test the integrity of the hardware and code 
running system functions. 
Confine system-produced intelligible emanations 
to within a specified lirnit. 
,-----
ILimit system-produced intelligible emanations to within a specified limit. 
Limit system-produced electromagnetic 
lemanations to within a specified lirnit. 
!Run executable code in a protected ~o~~in 
Jwhere the code's potential errors or malicious 
1code will not significantly impact other system 
1functions of other valid users of the system. 
T.Dev Flawed Code.Dev FC 
Replication 








T.Hack _ Crypto. Hack _phys _ Cnf 
Eman 




T.Malicious Code.Mal Code U 
- - -
sr Exe 
T.Mal icious Code.Mal Code H - - -
ack Exe 
T.Malicious Code.Mal Code 1 - - -
1 r 
,--------- Provide tools, techniques, and security employed 
during the development phase. Detect and 
1
0.Lifecycle _ Security 
resolve flaws during the operational phase. 
Provide safe destruction techniques. 
~,0- _-L-im- it __ A_c-ti_o_n_s __ A_u_t_h ____ Restrict the actions a user may perform before 
the T0E verifies the identity of the user. 
0.Limit Comm Sessions 
fo. Limit_ Mult_ Sessions 
0 .Limit 0bserveRoles 
,------- - --
0.Maintain Sec Domain 
Provide mechanisms to limit the number of 
sessions that the user can initiate, if the user 
initiates multiple sessions that exceed the 
processors ability to perform in a reliable and 
efficient manner. These sessions could ether be 
communication (TCP/IP) sessions or user login 
sessions. 
[
Provide th~ capabiÙty to li~it- th~ nu~ber of 
sessions that a user may have open at one time. 
Provide authorized users with the capability to 
observe the usage of specified services or 
resources as necessary to perform their duties. 
Maintain at least one security domain for system 
(T0E) execution to protect the T0E from 
interference and tampering. 
T Exe 
T.Admin Err Commit.Admin E - - -
!rr _Authentic 
; 
iT.User Misuse Av! Resc.User 
1 - - - -
1Prcsr 0verload 
!T.Us~r Misuse Av! Resc.User 
1 - - - -
·Stg_ 0verload 
!T.User Misuse Av! Resc.User - - - -
!Comm 0verload 
i -
T.Hack _ Social_ Engineer.Hack _ 
. SocEng_Password 
1 




--·-·-- --- - ----· ,-- ----------
0.Maintenance Access 
0.Maintenance Recover 
Control access to the system by maintenance 
personnel who troubleshoot the system and 
perform system updates. 
Terminate maintenance user system access 
privilege automatically after expiration of 
assigned timed interval. 
1
0 .M: licious=Code fi ncorporate malicious code prevention 
lprocedures and mechanisms . 
.-1------------IProvide management on resource security 
0 . Manage_ Res_ Sec_ Attr 
lattributes. 
0.Manage_ TSF _Data 
0 .No Residual lnfo 
10. Non Repud _Assess _ Recd 
10 .NonRepud _ Assess _ Sent 
1 
j0.NonRepud_Gen_Recd 
0 .NonRepud _ Gen _ Sent 
Manage security-critical (TSF) data to ensure 
that the size of the data does not exceed the 
space allocated for storage of the data. 
Ensure there is no "object reuse;" i.e., ensure that 
there is no residual information in some 
information containers or system resources upon 
their reallocation to different users. 
Support nonrepudiation for received information 
by supporting remote handling of nonrepudiation 
evidence if needed. 
Support nonrepudiation for sent information by 
supporting remote handling of nonrepudiation 
evidence if needed. 
!Prevent a receiving user from avoiding 
accountability for rece1vmg a message by 
providing evidence that the user received the 
message. 
Prevent a user from avoiding accountability for 
sending a message to a recipient at a different 
site by providing evidence that the user sent the 
T.Admin Err 0mit.Admin Err -
0mit_Trap 
iT.Admin Err 0mit.Admin Err - - -
0mit_Trap 
T.User Misuse Av! Resc.User - - - -
0bst Res Use 
T.Hack Avl Resource.Hack St - -
g_0verload 
T.User Misuse Av! Resc.User - - - -
iErrAvl AudExhst 
T.Dev Flawed Code.Dev FC - - - -
Buff Not Clr 
T.User Collect.User Collect Re 
sidue 
T. Repudiate _ Transact. Repudiate 
Trans 
T.Repudiate _ Send.Repudiate _ Se 
nd 
T. Repudiate _ Transact. Repudiate 
Trans 
T.Repudiate _ Transact.Repudiate 
Trans 
T.Repudiate _ Receive.Repudiate 
Rcvr 
T. Repudiate _ Send. Repudiate _ Se 
nd 
T.Repudiate _ Transact.Repudiate 
,------------
O.NonRepud _ Loc ais_ Rcvd 
0 .NonRepud _ Locals _ Sent 
lo .NonRepudiate _ Recd 
r·· 









Prevent user from avoiding accountability for 
receiving a message from another user on the 
same system by providing evidence that the user 
received the message. 
Prevent user from avoiding accountability for 
sending a message to another user on the same 




that a user received 
IProvide evidence that a user sent information. 
Ma in tain object security attributes with moderate 
to high accuracy (under the guidance of qualified 
users). 
Require domain protection for objects. Specify 
object classes ( domains ), user groups, and 
operation classes. Use these to specify which 
operations may be performed on which objects 
by which users. Basically this controls what 
users can do in a given group. 
Permit some users to maintain partial anonymity 
when using specified services or resources by 
means of aliases. 
Permit some users to maintain anonymity when 
using specified services or resources. 
Trans 
!T.Repudiate _ Receive.Repudiate 
: Rcvr Int 
jT.Repudiate _ Transact.Repudiate 
' Trans 
T .Repudiate _ Transact.Repudiate 
Trans 
IT.Sp~~fmg.Hack _ Spoof_ MsgHd 
ir 
T.User Err Slf Protect.User Er - - - -
r _ Object_ Attr 
T.Admin _Hostile_ Modify .Adm _ 
Hstl Mod TSFCode 
T.Malicious _Code.Mal_ Code_ H 
iack _ Downld 
T.Malicious _Code.Mal_ Code_ I 
!T _ Download 








Provide some services or resources to specified 
users without soliciting from the user 
!information that is relevant to the user's privacy. 
~------------
1 
Ensure that a user may make multiple uses of a 
O.Prevent_Link service or resource without other specified users 
being able to link these uses together. 
O.Prevent Observe 
10.Priority _ Of_ Service 
1 
-----------
Ens ure that a user may use a service or resource 
without other specified users being able to 
observe that the service or resource is being 
used. 
Control access to resources so that lower-priority 
activities do not unduly interfere with or delay 
higher-priority activities . 
T.Admin UserPriv.Admin User 
·Priv Col 




T.User Misuse Av! Resc.User 
- - - -
i Prcsr _ Overload 
T.Hack_Avl_Resource.Hack_Pr 
icsr Overload 
!T.Component_Failure.Phys _ Co 
'mpFail_Res 
T.User Misuse Avl Resc.User 
Obst Res Use 
T.Admin Err Commit.Admin E 
- - -
rr lnfo -
T.Hack Av! Resource.Hack Co - - -
imm_Overload 
T.User Misuse Av! Resc.User - -
Comm Overload 






Jo .Rcv _ MsgMod _ Rcvr 
··-·······. ........... __ ,, ...... 
O.React Discovered Atk - -
O.Reference Monitor 
O.Remote Execution 
O.Resource _ Quotas 






Provide capability for an administrator to 
determine the use status of ail privileged 
interfaces. This would include interfaces used by 
maintenance personnel. 
The TSF recognizes changes to messages that 
occurred in transit, including insertion of 
spurious messages and deletion or replay of 
legitimate messages. 
!The TSF detects and corrects changes in 
messages received from a remote trusted site . 
···--·········-
Implement automated notification or other 
reactions to the TSF-discovered attacks in an 
effort to identify attacks and to create an attack 
deterrent. 
Always invoke mechanisms that enforce security 
policies (i .e., as for a traditional reference 
monitor). 
Disable a remote entity's ability to execute local 
code. 
Use resource quotas to limit user and service use 
of system resources to a level that will prevent 
degradation or denial of service to other critical 
users and services. 
Produce cipher text that cannot be decrypted 
without either massive computational power or 
knowledge of the encryption key through robust 
encryption techniques. 
--- ~ --- ·-· - --·· . 
Recover from user operations by undoing some 
user operations (i.e. , "roll ing back") to restore a 
previous known state. 
f Provide a screen · lod fu;ction t~ pre~~-;;-t ~n 
junauthorized user from using an unattended 
!
computer where a valid user has an active 
session. 
________ .... , ....................................... --·-·· 
T.User_Misuse_Avl_Resc.User 
!Stg_ Overload 
!T.Admin Err Omit.Admin Err 
JOmit_Trap 
T.Hack _ Msg_ Data.Hack _ MsgD 
ata RcvUsr 
iT.Hack _ Msg_ Data.Hack _ MsgD 
lata RcvUsr 
!T.Hack A vl Resource.Hack Pr 
:csr _ Overload 
'T.User_Modify.User_Modify_T 
:SFData 
T.Malicious Code.Mal Code H - -
ack Exe 




'T.Admin Err Commit.Admin E 
- -
,rr_Info 
!T.Hack _ A vl Resource.Hack _ St 
!g Overload 
1T-:-Hack Av! Resource.Hack Pr - -
lcsr Overload 
!T.User Misuse Av! Resc.User - - -
:Stg_ Overload 
lT.User_Misuse_Avl_Resc.User 
iPrcsr _ Overload 
!T.Component_Failure.Phys _ Co 
:mpFail_ Res 
T.User Misuse Av! Resc.User 
Comm Overload 
T.Hack _ Crypto.Hack _ Crypto _Pl 
lnTxt 
T.Hack _ Crypto.Hack _ Crypto _ C 
·hsnCy 
'T. Hack _ Crypto.Hack _ Crypto _ C 
hsnPln 
T.Hack _ Crypto. Hack _ Crypto _ C 
ypher 
T.Hack _ Crypto.Hack _ Crypto _ C 
'hsnTxt 
T.User Err Inaccess.User Err 
,Delete 
T .Hack _ Masq .Hack _ Masq_ Uwk 
stn 
O.Secure _ Configuration 
O.Secure State 
O.Security _Attr _ Mgt 
0 .Security _Data_ Mgt 
O.Security _Func _ Mgt 
Manage and update system security policy data 
and enforcement functions, and other security-
relevant configuration data, in accordance with 
organizational security policies. 
Maintain and recover to a secure state without 
security compromise after system error or other 
interruption of system operation. 
Manage the initialization of, values for, and 
allowable operations on security attributes. 
Manage the initialization of, limits on, and 
allowable operations on security-critical data. 
Provide management mechanisms for security 
mechanisms. 
T.Admin Err Omit.Admin Err 
lUpdate 




T.Admin Err Commit.Admin E 
rr_AC_po!icy 
T.User Err lnaccess.User Err 
Set Attr 
T.Admin Err Commit.Admin E 
rr User Attr 
T.User Err lnaccess.User Err - - - -
Mod Attr 
T.Admin Err Commit.Admin E 
.rr _ Resource 
\T.Admin _Err_ Commit.Admin _ E 
Jrr_AC_policy 
T.Admin Err Commit.Admin E . - -
irr _ Sys _ Entry 
TAdmin Err Commit.Admin E -
:rr Authentic 
T.Admin _ Err Commit.Admin _ E 
lrr_User_Attr 
T.Admin _ Err Commit.Admin _ E 
irr Audit 
:T Ilser_Modify.User_Modify _A 
:uth 
'T.Admin Err Commit.Admin E - - -
rr lnfo 
'T.Admin Err Commit.Admin E - -
,rr_User_Attr 
iT.Admin Err Commit.Admin_E 
irr_AC_Policy 
~--- •«·--------~-----·-·---------------------------
O.Security _ Roles 
lo.Session Terrnination 
1 -
iO.Snt_ MsgMod _ ID 
1 
iO. Snt_ MsgMod _ Rcvr 
Maintain security-relevant roles and the 
association of users with th ose roles. 
T.User_Modify.User_Modify_A 
:udit 
!T.Admin Err Commit.Admin E 
rr_AC_po!icy 
T.User Collect.User Collect Ea - - -
ves 
:T.Admin Err Commit.Admin E - -
:rr Audit 
T.Admin Err Commit.Admin E - -
1rr_User_Attr 
T.Admin Err Commit.Admin E 
rr lnfo 
System terrninates a session after a given T.Back _ Masq.Back _ Masq_ Uwk 
interval of inactivity. stn 
-- ------~---· ~ ------ ~- -----
The TSF supports recognition of changes to 
transmitted messages that occurred m transit, 
including insertion of spurious messages and 
deletion or replay of legitimate messages. 
The TSF supports detection and correction 
changes m messages sent to a remote trusted 
site. 
T.Back _ Msg_ Data.Back_ MsgD 
ata SndUsr 
T.Back _ Msg_ Data.Back_ MsgD 
ata SndUsr 
O.Source Code Exam - -
lü.Storage _ Integrity 
~-----------
O.Sys _ Access _ Banners 
O.Sys _Assur_ HW /SW /FW 
Examine for accidentai or deliberate flaws in 
code made by the developer. The accidentai 
flaws could be Jack of engineering detail or bad 
design. Where the deliberate flaws would 
include building trapdoors for later entry as an 
example. 
Present each possible output value in a standard 
form. 
IProvide integrity for data. 
ln fo rm the user of the possibility of the system 
monitoring his actions, and that misuse of the 
system may result in criminal or civil penalties. 
Ensure that security-relevant software, hardware, 
and fmnware are correctly functioning through 
features and procedures. 
1 
~o- _-S_y_s __ B_a_c_ku_ p __ P_ro_c_s ____ Provide backup procedures to ensure that the 
,system can be reconstructed. 
O.Sys _Backup_ Restore 
O.Sys _Backup_ Storage 
--hA 





0. Tamper _ Resistance 
1 
10 . Trusted _OS_ Recov 
! 
jO. Trusted _path 
---
Provide through frequent backups, restoration of 
security-relevant changes to the system between 
backup and restore, and restoration of the 
security-relevant system state (e.g. access 
control list) without destruction of other system 
data. 
Provide sufficient backup storage and effective 
restoration to ensure that the system can be 
recreated. 
IDetect modifications to backup hardware, ,firmware, and software. 
Protect the system security functions through 
technical features . 
Provide system features that detect physical 
tampering of a system component, and use those 
features to limit security breaches. 
Prevent or resist physical tampering with 
specified system devices and components. 
Ensure that a replaced failed component when 
re-integrated into the system will recover such 
that it will not cause errors or security breaches 
in other parts of the system. 
·1· ------ -- - --
Provide a trusted path between the user and the 
-···--·· ------- ---· ..................... ·---······ ···-·· 
' 
T.Dev Flawed Code.Dev FC T - - -
!rap_ Door 
iT.User_Abuse Conf.User Abus -
ie_Conf_Steg 





T.Admin Hostile _Modify.Adm_ 
-Hstl Mod TSFCode -




T.User Misuse Av! Resc.User - -
Obst Res Use 
T.Hack _ Phys.Hack _ Phys _ Dama 
ge 





T .Hack_Phys.Hack _Phys _ Dama 
•ge 
T.Hack _ Comm _ Eavesdrop. Hack 
_ CommEaves _ Tap 
T.User Misuse Avl Resc.User - - - -
·Obst Res Use 
T.Failure_DS_Comp.Failure_DS 
Comm 








jo. Trusted _ Recovery 
~-----------
0. Trusted _ Recovery _ Doc 
O.TSF Mod Limit 
F 
...................................  
Rcv Err ID Loc - - -
O.TSF Rcv Err ID Rem 
system. Execution of a user-requested action 
must be made via a trusted path with the 
following properties: * The path is logically 
distinct from, and cannot be confused with other 
communication paths (by either the user or the 
system). * The path provides assured 
identification of its end points. 
T.User Collect.User Collect De - - -
ce1ve 
T.Malicious Code.Mal Code H - - -
ack Exe 
T Hack _ Masq.Hack _ Masq_ Uwk 
:Stn 
:T.Hack _ Masq.Hack _ Masq_ Hija 
ick T.Hack_AC.Hack AC_ Weak 
-------~--
Provide a trusted path to security-critical (TSF) IT.Admin_Hostile_Modify.Adm_ 
data in which both end points have assured !Hstl_Mod_DataAps 
identities. For the remote user, there needs to be !T.Malicious Code.Mal Code H 
a trusted channel as well. iack Exe 
~------------------
Re c ove ry to a secure state, without security !T.Power_Disrupt.Power_Disrupt 
compromise, after a discontinuity of operations. !_Reset 
Pro vide trusted recovery to ensure that data 
cannot be lost or misplaced. Any circumstances 
which can cause untrusted recovery to be 
documented with mitigating procedures 
established. 
Limit the malicious modification of security-
critical (TSF) code and data to include specific 
system code to prevent the system security 
protection capabiiities from being diminished or 
weakened. 
Identification by the system (TOE) of 
modification of security-critical (TSF) data 
occurring in transit from a remote trusted site 
must occur. 
Identification by the remote site of the 
modification of security-critical (TSF) data 
occurring in transit from the remote site must 
occur. 
T.Admin _Hostile_ Modify.Adm _ 
Hstl Mod TSFCode 
1
T.Hack _ Msg_ Data.Hack _ MsgD 
ata RcvTSF 
T.Hack _ Msg_ Data.Hack _ MsgD 
.ata_RcvTSF 
,------------~------------------•- •N-----•••----------, 
O.TSF Rcv Err Rcvr Loc - - - -
O.TSF Rcv Err Rcvr Rem - - - -
1 
1 
Identification and correction of modification of 
security-critical (TSF) data occurring in transit 
from a remote site by the system shall occur. 
Identification and modification of security-
critical (TSF) data occurring in transit to the 
system (TOE) by a remote trusted site must 
occur, and the remote site shall be able to 
recover by transmitting a correct version. 
---------~-
[o. TSF_ Snd _Err_ ID_ Loc 
r 





Snd Err Rcvr Loc - - -
r ~-~--------
iO.TSF Snd Err Rcvr Rem 
,O.User Attributes 
Identification of modification of security-critical 
(TSF) data occurring in transit to a remote site 
by the TSF must occur. 
Identification of modification of security-critical 
(TSF) data occurring in transit to a remote site 
by the remote site must occur. 
·------- ' ~-
Identification of modification of security-critical 
(TSF) data occurring in transit to a remote site 
by the remote site must occur, and shall be able 
to recover by retransmitting a correct version. 
Identification and correction of modification of 
security-critical (TSF) data occurring in transit to 
the remote site by the remote site must occur. 
IMaintain ; ~~t ~f security ;tt:ributes (which may include group membership, clearance, access 




T.Hack _ Msg_ Data.Hack _ MsgD 
·ata SndTSF 
T.Hack _ Msg_ Data.Hack _ MsgD 
ata SndTSF 
T.Hack _ Msg_ Data.Hack _MsgD 
ata SndTSF 
T.Hack _ Msg_ Data.Hack _ MsgD 
ata SndTSF 
T.Admin Err Commit.Admin E 
rr User Attr 
O.User Auth Enhanced 
O. User _Auth _ Management 
O.User _ Auth _ Multiple 
O.User Conf Prevention 
·r ····················· .................................. ························································ 
l
rights, etc.) associated with individual users in 
-
addition to user identity. 
Execute enhanced measures to ensure that either 
user authentication data cannot be stolen or 
when it is stolen, it cannot be used to gain access 
to the system. 
.--------------------
Manage and update user authorization and 
privilege data in accordance with organizational 
security and personnel policies. 
Invoke multiple authentication mechanisms, 
which will provide confidence that the user is 
who they say they are. 
Prevent unauthorized export of confidential 
information from the TOE with moderate 
effectiveness. 
1 
11Allow dial-in access through secure mechanisms O.User_Data_Dial-in 
only. 
1
0.User_Data_lntegri~ - ---IProvide appropriate integrity protection for 
1stored user data. -
O.User Data Transfer 
O.User Defined AC - -
O.User Guidance 
Provide the ability to have physically protected 
communications lines, intrusion detection for 
communications lines, and/or need-to-know 
isolation for communications lines. 
,---------· ......... ·---··· 
Enforce an access control policy whereby users 
may determine who may access information they 
control. 
................... -- ----·····--- -···· 
Provide documentation for the general user. 
---···"·-




!T.Spoofing.Hack _ Spoof _ Login 





\T. User_ Err_ Conf. User_ Err_ Con 
lf_Exp 
;T.User c~)Ï~~t.Ü;~~ Collect D~ - - -
/duce 
IT.User _ Collect.User_ Collect_Br 
iowse 









1T.Hack Social_ Engineer.Hack _ 
1 SocEng_ Syslnfo 
lT. User_ Err_ lnaccess. User_ Err_ 
,set Attr 
T.User Err lnaccess.User Err 
:Mod_Attr 
'T.User Err lnaccess.User Err 
Delete 
Annex C: Sorne abbreviations 
CC Common Criteria 
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level 
1T Information Technology 
PP Protection Profile 
SF Security Function 
SFP Security Function Policy 
SOF Strength ofFunction 
ST Security Target 
TOE Target of Evaluation 
TSC TSF Scope of Control 
TSF TOE Security Functions 
TSFI TSF Interface 
TSP TOE Security Policy 

Annex D sample (minimalist) XML file for SecGen 
<?xml version="l.0" standalone="yes" ?> 
- <PPDocument> 
= <Objectives class="SecGen.ObjectiveRepository"> 
= <Objective class="SecGen.SecObjective"> 
<objectivedescription>Design administrative functions in such a way that 
administrators do not automatically have access to user objects, except for 
necessary exceptions. For an accounts administrator, the necessary exceptions 
include allocation and de-allocation of storage. For an audit administrator, the 
necessary exceptions include observation of audited actions. In general, the 
exceptions tend to be role specific.</objectivedescription> 
<objectivecoverage>T.Admin_Hostile_Modify.Adm_Hstl_Mod_Data_AC,T.Admin_ 
Hostile_Modify.Adm_Hstl_Mod_DataAps,T.Admin_Hostile_Modify.Adm_Hstl_Mo 





= <Threats class="SecGen.ThreatRepository"> 
- <Threat class="SecGen.SecThreat"> 
<id>1</id> 
< id_old > Admin_Err _Commit</id_old > 
<threatname>T.Admin_Err_Commit.Adm_Err_Crypto</threatname> 
<threatdescription>An administrator misconfigures cryptographie functions or 
stores plaintext keys in insecure areas.</threatdescription> 
</Threat> 
</Threats> 
= <Policies class="SecGen.PolicyRepository"> 
= <Policy class="SecGen.SecPolicy"> 
< policyname > P .Audit_Gen_User</policyname > 
<policydescription>Individuals shall be held accountable for their 





= <Assumptions class="SecGen.SecRepository"> 
- <Assumption class="SecGen.SecAssumption"> 
- <assumptiondiscussion>Category includes considerations of whether the 
administrator is hostile or nice, local or remote.< / assumptiondiscussion> 
<id>1</id> 
<assumptionname>A.Admin_Attitude</assumptionname> 
<assumptiondescription>This category of assumptions covers the motives, attitude, 




= <ComponentRepository class="SecGen.ComponentRepository"> 
= <SecComponent class="SecGen.SecComponent"> 
<componentdescription>Partial CM automation</componentdescription> 
<id>ACM_AUT.1</id> 








Annex E : XSLT transormation file for generating Protection 
Profile Report 
<?xml version="l.O" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?> 
<!-- Edited with XML Spy v4.2 --> 
<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0" xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform"> 





<xsl:call-template name="threats" /> 
<xsl:call-template name="policies" /> 

















<xsl:value-of select="objectivename" /> 
</xsl:attribute> 




<xsl:value-of select="objectivedescription" /> 
</td> 
<td width="100px"> 
<xsl:value-of select="translate(objectivecoverage, ', ' , ' ') " /> 
</td> 
</tr> 













<xsl: for-each select= "PPDocument/Threats/Threat" > 
<tr> 
<xsl:variable name="threatname"> 




test=" cou nt(/ /PPDocu ment/Objectives/Objective [contai ns( objectivecoverage, 
$threatname)]) = 0"> 
<font color='Red'>!</font> 
</xsl:if> 




test=" cou nt(//PPDocu ment/O bjectives/Objective[ contai ns( objectivecove rage, 
$threatname)]) = 0"> 
<font color='Red'>!</font> 
</xsl:if> 




test=" cou nt(//PPDocu ment/Oobjectives/Objective [ contains( objectivecoverage, 


















test=" cou nt(//PPDocu ment/Objectives/Objective [ contai ns( objectivecoverage, 
$threatname)]) = 0"> 
















<xsl: for-each select= "PPDocu ment/Policies/Policy" > 
<tr> 
<td> 
<xsl:value-of select="policyname" /></td> 
<td> 
<xsl:value-of select="policydescription" /> 
</td> 
<td> 




<xsl:value-of select="policyname" /> 
</xsl :variable> 
<xsl :for-each 
select= "//PPDocu ment/Objectives/Objective [ contains( objectivecoverage, $na me)]"> 
<a><xsl:attribute name="href"># 
<xsl:value-of select="objectivename" /> 
</xsl: attribute> <xsl: value-of select= "objectivename" 
/></a> < br/> </xsl :for-each> </td > 
</tr> 
</xsl :for-each> 
</table> 
</xsl:template> 
</xsl: stylesheet> 
3 

